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Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ahmed Shaheed*

Summary

In the present report, the fourth to be submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to Council resolution 25/24, the Special Rapporteur highlights developments in the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran since his fourth interim report submitted to the General Assembly (A/68/503) in October 2013.

The report examines ongoing concerns and emerging developments in the State’s human rights situation. Although the report is not exhaustive, it provides a picture of the prevailing situation as observed in the reports submitted to and examined by the Special Rapporteur. In particular, and in view of the forthcoming adoption of the second Universal Periodic Review of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it analysis these in light of the recommendations made during the UPR process.

* Late submission.
** The annexes to the present report are circulated as received, in the language of submission only.
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I. Introduction

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran participated in a second cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in October 2014. A total of 104 delegations presented some 291 recommendations related to rights guaranteed by five international human rights conventions\(^1\) ratified by Iran. The majority of these recommendations call on the Government to consider strengthening protections for civil and political rights and to cease practices that violate them. They also encourage the Government to accede to conventions that abolish the use of capital punishment, protect against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, protect the rights of migrant workers and advance gender equality. Recommendations also pertain to improvements in protections for vulnerable groups, including religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities; encourage the establishment of a Paris Principle-compliant National Human Rights Institute (NHRI); and enjoin cooperation with the United Nations human rights mechanisms.

2. Issues emphasized in the 2014 recommendations mirrored those raised during the Islamic Republic of Iran’s first UPR cycle in 2010. Many recommendations also relate to laws, policies, and practices presented in the Special Rapporteur’s reports since the onset of his work.

<table>
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<th>Related Human Rights Issue</th>
<th>2010 Accepted</th>
<th>Number Rejected</th>
<th>2014 Accepted</th>
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<td>Accession to new treaties (CEDAW, CAT, ICRMW, ICCPR-OP2, and more)</td>
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3. Aspects of laws, policies and practices previously identified by the United Nations human rights mechanisms, and that are presented in the current report continue to undermine the Government’s capacity to improve human rights conditions. The use of capital and other forms of cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment persist at alarming rates. This is especially alarming given the frequent application of the death penalty for crimes not considered “most serious” under international human rights law, and considering policies and practices previously identified by the United Nations human rights mechanisms that continue to challenge the administration of justice.

4. A number of draft laws and policies containing provisions that appear to further negate human rights guaranteed by national and international laws are either currently under consideration or have been adopted since March 2014. These include provisions that appear to expand government influence over the media, civil society, political organizations, and the legal community. Policies that further limit economic opportunities for women and that segregate them in the workplace are currently under consideration and/or being implemented.

5. The resulting adverse effects of laws and practices can be observed in reports that continued to emanate from the country this past year about the ongoing arrests of human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, religious and ethnic minorities, accompanied by open letters and confidential communications received about torture and violations of fair trial standards. Closures of media outlets and severe limitations on the Internet and social media also continue.

II. Methodology

6. Information for the present report was gathered during a fact-finding mission to Germany, Norway and Denmark, during which 39 interviews were conducted with victims and activists within the Iranian diaspora. The Special Rapporteur wishes to extend his gratitude to the Governments of all three countries for hosting his visits. Another 28 interviews were conducted with Iranians located inside Iran and elsewhere between July 2014 and January 2015.

7. The Special Rapporteur also reviewed information contained in open letters, confidential communications; news reports and broadcasts produced by domestic media outlets in the country; official statements; information relayed in Government responses to Special Procedure mandate holders’ inquiries; national and civil society stakeholder reports submitted for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s first and second UPR reviews; and reports submitted to the Special Rapporteur by credible human rights organizations. The Special Rapporteur also examined the content of various pieces of draft legislation currently under consideration.

III. Cooperation with the mandate holder

8. Twenty-nine communications were transmitted by the Special Procedures to the Government in 2014. This includes 27 urgent actions addressing concerns regarding torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, persecution of religious minorities and reprisals against individuals for alleged contact with United Nations human rights officials (regarding freedom of expression and assembly as well as detention conditions -including detainees insufficient access to medical care). The Government only responded to five of these communications, reducing its rate of reply from 40 percent in 2013 to 17 percent in 2014.

9. The Special Rapporteur thanks the Government for arranging meetings with visiting delegations in Geneva, including a meeting in September 2014 with representatives from
the judiciary, the High Council for Human Rights in Iran and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and for providing detailed comments to his latest report to the General Assembly.  

10. Unfortunately, the Special Rapporteur’s requests for visits to the country to deepen dialogue with government officials and to further ascertain the veracity of complaints forwarded to the Special Procedures remain unaddressed. A large number of requests for visits from various other Special Procedures remain pending, despite several statements since 2011 regarding the Government’s intent to strengthen this aspect of its cooperation with the human rights mechanisms.

IV. Reprisals against activists

11. The Special Rapporteur renews his concerns about incidents that appear to be reprisals against individuals for contact with international human rights organizations and UN human rights mechanisms. Since August 2014, 5 cases have been reported (the details of which are included in the Annex). They include the prosecution of Ms. Atena Daemi, Mr. Saeed Shirzad, Mr. Mohammad Ali Taheri, Mr. Behnam Ebrahimzadeh, and Mr. Mohammad Reza Pourjashari. At least 15 individuals reportedly have been detained, charged, prosecuted or faced intimidation for contact with the Special Procedures since 2011.

V. Overview of the Civil and Political Rights

A. Right to life

12. The Government received 29 recommendations related to use of the death penalty during its first UPR in 2010, and 41 were made during its second review in 2014.

13. At least 753 individuals were reportedly executed in 2014 (the highest total recorded in the past 12 years). This includes the execution of 25 women and 53 public executions. Nearly half of all executions — 362 — were for drug-related crimes (not including those drug related offenses that were also committed in conjunction with homicide crimes), which do not meet the internationally accepted threshold of “most serious crimes” required for use of the death penalty. In at least four cases the families of homicide victims provided pardons only after authorities implemented the death penalty by hanging. In these instances, authorities ceased the execution and lowered individuals after a period of suspension.

\[2\] A/69/356

14. In November and December 2014, Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, head of the High Council for Human Rights in Iran, reiterated calls to amend the anti-Narcotics Law, maintaining that such a policy shift would reduce the execution rate by 80 per cent. Capital punishment for drug-related offenses in the country is governed by the 1988 Anti-Narcotics Law and its 1997 and 2011 amendments. The current version of the law mandates the death penalty for 17 offenses. In addition to the broad range of drug crimes for which the death penalty is prescribed, this mandate is automatically triggered when a minimum threshold amount of contraband is involved (e.g. 30 grams in the case of heroin, morphine, cocaine, MDMA / ecstasy, and methamphetamine).

15. The revised Islamic Penal Code, which came into force in June 2013, also provides capital punishment for juvenile offenders (unless the offender is found to lack the mental capacity to understand the nature of the crime or its consequences). Regardless of the revision, juvenile executions continue. Reports indicate that at least 13 juveniles may have been executed in 2014 alone.

16. At least 33 individuals were reportedly executed in the Kerman Prison between 26 August and 14 November 2014. All but one of these individuals was reportedly convicted of drug-related crimes. During this period, the authorities made no public announcement of

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4 Euro News, Iran's Larijani slams West's 'bias' on human rights, 7 November 2014; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=roV0Y1_CxBI
5 Semi-official news, Mizanonline, 5 December 2014; http://mizanonline.ir/fa/content/19246
executions at the Kerman Prison. Reports of these executions raise alarm about possible underreporting.\(^8\)

**B. Fair trial standards**

17. Following a country visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2003, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) recommended the establishment of safeguards for legal counsel against intimidation; and the involvement of legal counsel from the beginning of a case, regardless of the nature of the allegations against the accused. Likewise, the Government received 13 recommendations related to fair trial standards and judicial independence during the 2014 UPR, equal to the number of recommendations made in 2010. Several recommendations stressed the need to ensure immediate access to a lawyer of one’s choosing, and adequate access to all evidence gathered for the prosecution.

18. Article 48 of the revised Code of Criminal Procedures (effective in June 2015)\(^9\), provides defendants the right to request “the presence of a lawyer at the onset of detention. However, a note to Article 48 allows for exceptions, e.g. if the accused is detained on suspicion of committing offences, such as organized crime, crimes against national security, theft and drug-related offences, they may be prohibited from accessing a lawyer for up to a week after arrest. It should be noted that most violations of fair trial standards reportedly occur during the investigation phase. Individuals including lawyers, journalists, religious and ethnic minorities who peacefully exercise internationally recognized rights, are frequently convicted of national security offenses.

**C. Freedom from arbitrary detention**

19. There has been considerable focus on the continued house arrest of Green Movement leaders and former presidential candidates Messrs. The country approaches the 4\(^{th}\) anniversary of the confinement of Mehdi Karroubi, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and his wife, Ms. Zahra Rahnavard, as well as the 5\(^{th}\) anniversary of the 2009 demonstrations. Between 2011 through 2013, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) issued 10 Opinions regarding the detention of 13 Iranians, including those of the aforementioned opposition leaders along with several journalists, lawyers, a Christian pastor, and a student activist.\(^10\) The Government has only responded to three of the 10 communications.

20. In its Opinions, the WGAD concluded that 12 of the 13 individuals appear to have been detained for exercising their right to freedom of expression, opinion, religion, belief, or association, and encouraged the government to immediately release individuals charged with the legitimate exercise of these freedoms; and to compensate them for their arbitrary detention. One such prisoner, Ms. Nasrin Sotodeh, was released prior to the expiration of her sentence, while Mr. Bahman Ahmadi Amouee and Mr. Kiarash Kamrani were released following the completion of their sentences. None of the individuals have been compensated as recommended by the WGAD.

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\(^9\) Semi-official news, Mizanonline, 26 October 2014; http://mizanonline.ir/fa/content/12550

\(^10\) See Annex
D. Independence of lawyers

21. International standards recognize the right of lawyers to practice their profession, "in accordance with generally recognized professional ethics without restrictions, influence, pressure or undue interference from any quarter." An independent bar association and ability to practice law independently provide indispensable guarantees to the protection of human rights and access to justice. It is stated, “lawyers cannot adequately and properly perform their duties while subject to external interference and controls over their ability to practice.”

22. In 2012, the International Bar Association and the Special Rapporteur expressed concern over the Formal Attorneyship Bill, which would expand the government’s influence over the country’s Bar Association. In his report to the 68th session of the General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur welcomed the Government’s decision to suspend the consideration of the Bill in June 2013.

23. In September 2014, several amended versions of the draft Bill were submitted to the Parliament. Concern remains that the Bill continues to envision a significant role for government intervention and influence. Thus, encroaching on the independence of the Bar Association. For example, the Bill continues to envisage a Supervisory Board that would work with the Intelligence Ministry and the Intelligence and Protection Centers of the judiciary to assess lawyers’ qualifications for a license to practice, and for membership in the Supreme Council and the Board of Directors of the Bar Association. The Supervisory Board (comprised of representatives from the Executive and Judiciary, and five lawyers chosen by the Bar Association and approved by a committee comprised of the heads of Supreme Disciplinary Court for Judges) could initially suspend licenses. The Supreme Disciplinary Court of Judges would possess the authority to revoke licenses.

24. The Bar Association’s election for Board of Directors is also currently subject to significant government influence. Candidates for the biennial elections are approved by the Supreme Disciplinary Court for Judges, (who reportedly communicates with the Intelligence Ministry about candidates’ eligibility). The most recent election for the Board
of Directors took place on 13 March 2014, during which the Supreme Disciplinary Court for Judges initially disqualified 29 candidates. Three board members and 14 candidates that qualified for past elections were disqualified for this one.

25. The Bar Association is currently responsible for license renewal, but lawyers must reportedly pay a mandatory fee to the Judiciary for the renewal of their licenses. Requests for licenses to practice, or for law students to participate in internships are also subject to approval by the country’s security apparatus. Situations of law students being disqualified for student activism or being asked to pledge to avoid activism have been reported. Intelligence Ministry officials reportedly have a constant presence at the Bar Association.

26. At least 50 lawyers have reportedly been prosecuted since June 2009, for representing prisoners of conscience, in addition to political and “security” prisoners. Numerous Iranian lawyers have expressed concern about the failure of the Bar Association and its Board of Directors, to defend its own lawyers, due in part to its lack of independence. Human rights lawyer, Mr. Hossein Raeesi, expressed concern regarding the extent of judicial and security influence on the legal community, particularly outside of Tehran and amongst ethnic-minority lawyers, in contributing to a climate that discourages lawyers from accepting national security cases lodged against political and security defendants, and prisoners of conscience. For example, the Board of Directors of West Azerbaijan Province suspended the license of Kurdish human rights lawyer, Mr. Masoud Shamsnejad, who had represented Kurdish political prisoners, after which he was indicted for “propagation against the system.” He began his 4-month sentence on 19 October 2014.

E. Detention conditions and treatment of prisoners

27. The Special Rapporteur remains concerned about reports of insufficient or nonexistent access to medical services for detainees, and insufficient segregation practices in prisons. Between April and December 2014, the Special Rapporteur and other thematic mandate holders transmitted five communications concerning the deteriorating health conditions of 16 detainees in urgent need of specialized medical care outside prison. Some of these individuals were reportedly at risk of dying due to inadequate medical attention. In a very few cases, prisoners were allowed to seek medical aid outside prison. The United

21 Mr. Hossein Raeesi, human rights lawyer, on 22 December 2014; http://cshr.org.uk/human-rights-portal/2692
22 Mr. Hossein Raeesi, human rights lawyer, on 31 December 2014; http://cshr.org.uk/human-rights-portal/2692
23 Ibid
24 Ibid. See also Rozoonline news, 18 March 2014; http://www.roozonline.com/persian/opinion/opinion-article/archive/2014/march/18/article/-9c61eff539.html
25 Ibid
26 Ibid
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners mandates that sick prisoners requiring specialized treatment be provided adequate access to appropriate medical institutions and staff and call for the separation of prisoners on the basis of gender, age, criminal record, and the legal reason for their detention.

28. On 20 November 2014, at least 24 Kurdish prisoners in Ward 12 of Urumia Central Prison (in the West Azerbaijan Province) reportedly embarked on hunger strikes to protest insufficient prisoner segregation and inadequate access to medical treatment.\(^{28}\) Some of the prisoners are convicted of vaguely defined national security charges. An example of a few of the security charges are distributing pamphlets and statements to commemorate International Mother Language Day, posting articles on social networks, contacting Kurdish opposition websites, distributing political pamphlets and cooperating with or joining opposition parties.

29. Allegedly, on 9 December 2014, the security forces of Urumia Central prison surrounded Ward 12 and threatened to attack protestors if they continued their hunger strike. In response to the hunger strike, several protestors were reportedly summoned to the Intelligence Office and subjected to various threats, such as new charges, transfer to solitary confinement, imprisonment in “exile,” and the arrest of family members. Others engaged in the hunger strikes were threatened with having their execution sentences expedited (including the death sentences of Messrs). Ali Afsahi, Mohammad Abdollahi, and Saman Nasim, an alleged juvenile offender. On 10 December, intelligence officials allegedly demanded that Mr. Saman Nasim’s a juvenile offender family encourage him to end his hunger strike, or his execution sentence would be imminently implemented.\(^{29}\) On 22 December 2014, 26 prisoners reportedly ended their strike after authorities committed to stop harassing family members and to investigate these concerns.

F. Freedoms of expression and access to information

30. The Government received 19 recommendations related freedom of expression, opinion and access to information during its 2014 UPR. The Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Culture held the 20th Press Fair of Iran, from 8-14 November 2014, titled: “Freedom with Responsibility.”\(^{30}\) Unfortunately, positive comments on media freedom from some officials at the event, including those from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Culture are contrary to the current treatment of journalists and bloggers in the country.

31. At least 13 journalists and bloggers have been arrested or detained since July 2014.\(^{31}\) As of December 2014, 30 journalists were detained, despite the release of at least eight journalists since July 2014 upon completion of their prison sentences.\(^{32}\) Charges include vaguely worded “national security” crimes, such as “propaganda against the system,” “assembly and collusion against the system,” “insulting the Supreme Leader,” and “spreading falsehoods with intent to agitate the public consciousness.” In September 2014, the Supreme Court of Iran upheld the death sentence for Mr. Soheil Arabi, a blogger convicted of sabb a-nabi (insulting the Islamic Prophet) for comments he allegedly posted on several Facebook accounts. He was also convicted of “insulting Government officials,”

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\(^{28}\) See Annex

\(^{29}\) Information Submitted to the Office of the Special Rapporteur on 16 December 2014

\(^{30}\) Semi-official news ISNA, 5 November 2014; http://isna.ir/fa/news/93081406796/

\(^{31}\) See Annex

\(^{32}\) See Annex. See also Committee to Protect Journalists, Special Report, 17 December 2014; https://cpj.org/reports/2014/12/journalists-in-prison-china-is-worlds-worst-jailer.php
“insulting the Supreme Leader” and “propaganda against the system.” In its reply, The Government claims that Mr. Arabi “injured[sic] public religion sensation.”

32. Iranian authorities also reportedly continue to close publications and television stations deemed subversive to certain elements of the political establishment. The Ghanoun daily, Bahar newspaper, and Aseman publication were permitted to re-open, after having previously been closed for content deemed offensive.33 On 23 December 2014, the Roozan publication was closed by order of the Tehran Prosecutor; apparently in relation to an article it published marking the five-year anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. In August 2014, five privately-owned religious stations (Imam Hossein, Abolfazal Abass, Alghaem, Alzahra and Almehdi) were closed after being accused by the Intelligence Ministry of “working illegally for satellite TV stations based in the United States and Great Britain,” “provoking sectarian tension within Islam,” “showing a degrading image of Shi’ism,” and “insulting the holy figures of Islam.” On 8 January 2015, the Intelligence Ministry announced that the offices of 17 satellite TV channels that “supported enemies that were provoking sectarian tension within Islam” would be closed.34

33. The blocking and filtering of websites also continues to be ubiquitous and is apparently ordered by multiple agencies. It is unclear whether national laws provide the agencies with legal authority to interfere with websites. In October 2014, the head of the Administrative Justice Court and the Office of the Attorney General criticized the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance for directly shutting down websites that did not possess permits, arguing that neither the Ministry nor the Press Supervisory Board has the power to do so without an order from the Attorney General’s Office.35 In November, the Working Group on Determining Instances of Criminal Content confirmed that the Information and Technology Ministry will continue to filter access to data on Instagram.36 In December 2014 Fars News reported that “immoral” pages on Instagram were blocked.37

34. In November 2014, President Rouhani’s cabinet approved bylaws for the 2009 Law on Access to Information intended to allow access to details about the Government’s use of public funds.38 On a relevant note, the head of the Judiciary, Mr. Sadegh Larijani, announced that he ordered the Prosecutor’s office to monitor and summon anyone guilty of “overstating” Government corruption.39

1. **Draft bill to establish a “Media Council”**

35. On 10 August 2014, a bill titled, “Media Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” which appears to expand government oversight of the media was published.40 Journalists and legal experts have expressed serious concern regarding provisions in the draft law which gives the Government a role in issuing licenses to journalists, and in investigating and issuing punitive measures for “professional misconduct”(including temporary bans

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35 Radio Farda news, 14 October 2014; http://www.radiofarda.com/content/f6_iran_websites_filtering/26637464.html
40 Official website, Parliament of Iran; http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/790196
from journalism and the revocation of licenses). It is unclear what punitive measures, if any, will apply to individuals who engage in journalistic activities in absence of licenses. The ministry reportedly decided to suspend drafting of the Bill in response to criticism, stating that further consultations with journalists was necessary.

2. Political Crimes Bill

36. The Political Crimes bill was introduced by Parliament in September 2013 and amended in June 2014. The Bill defines political crimes as activities that advance intentions to influence the country’s affairs, its administrative and political institutions, or its domestic or foreign policies without intending to harm the tenets of the State. This includes insulting or defaming members of parliament and the Guardian Council, Ministers, and other Government officials; the publication of land the violation of other legal provisions. The Bill provides for public trial by jury for political and press offenses.

G. Freedom of peaceful assemblies and association

37. In 2011, the Human Rights Committee noted that assemblies and the establishment of associations in Iran are conditional upon compliance with the “principles of Islam,” which national legislation fails to define. The Committee encouraged the Iranian Government to release anyone held solely for the peaceful exercise of these rights, and urged the Government to withdraw a parliamentary bill on the Establishment and Supervision of Non-Governmental Organizations, which established a Committee chaired by the Interior Ministry and representatives from the Intelligence Ministry to manage NGOs.

38. At the country's October 2014 UPR, Secretary-General of the High Council for Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, stated to the 20th Session of the Working Group that over 17,000 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were active and working on various issues in Iran including the promotion and protection of human rights. Ongoing reports of the arrest of human rights activists for peacefully exercising legitimate rights continue to demonstrate that protections for these rights are capriciously applied, additionally these latest draft laws risk exacerbating the situation.

1. Draft bill on Non-Governmental Organizations

39. A bill presented by the Interior Ministry on 9 November 2014 appears to further threaten the independence of civil society. The Bill envisages councils at the national, provincial, and city levels that will, in part, be responsible for the issuance of activity licenses to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pursuing “social, cultural, artistic, health, environmental, cultural heritage, human rights, ethnic, and development” issues, and whose activities are not currently subject to other laws that govern professional organizations or political entities, such as political parties.

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43 Official website, Parliament of Iran; http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/legal_draft/state/856746
44 Ibid
45 Semi-official news Fars, 1 December 2014; http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930905000787,
46 Article 4 and article 2
40. According to the bill, the councils would also be responsible for the supervision and support of NGOs and for addressing their misconduct. NGOs would be able to officially pursue organizational activities upon receiving establishment permits, activity licenses, and after registering that license. Procedures introduced by the Bill to establish an association appears particularly burdensome and would subject NGOs to administrative supervision and discretion, which could then be used to suppress dissenting views or beliefs in violation of international laws and standards.

2. Formation and Activities of Political Parties and Groups bill

41. A bill on the Formation and Activities of Political Parties and Groups was first introduced in the parliament on 20 July 2012. On 20 July 2014, Parliament suspended consideration of the bill for three months amid concerns over its provisions.

42. Aspects of the bill are particularly disconcerting, as they appear to effectively disenfranchise individuals arrested and/or prosecuted for peacefully exercising rights to expression, association and assembly. This includes including individuals arrested and/or prosecuted during the months following the 2009 presidential elections, as well as lawyers, journalists, and human rights activists who may have expressed dissenting or critical views on a wide range of issues.

43. The Bill prohibits political parties from conducting activities in the absence of two permits issued by a 9-member Party Commission, consisting of government representatives, including officials from the Interior and Intelligence Ministries, Parliament, Attorney General, and head of Judiciary.

44. In order to obtain an initial permit, applicants must submit a list of proposed members along with the party’s manifesto; including worldview, intellectual and ideological foundations, objectives and plans to meet objectives, and the party’s general approach to cultural, economic, social, political, administrative and legal issues in the country. The applicant’s statute and manifesto must also explicitly state adherence to the Constitution and the principle of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist.

45. The bill also bans individuals associated with “counter-revolution” groups and those convicted of domestic and foreign security crimes from establishing a political party, and prohibits influential members of parties previously dissolved by a court that were influential members at the time of dissolution from joining a political party and/or from establishing one. On 14 December 2014, authorities stated that the new bill would be adopted before the 2016 parliamentary elections.

H. Freedom of religion or belief

46. Under Iranian law, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance is responsible for “[issuing] licenses for cultural, artistic and advocacy activities of religious minorities recognized under the Constitution.” According to the country’s Party Law, religious

47 Article 21
48 Official Website of Parliament of Iran; http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/legal_draft/state/814244
49 Young journalist club, 13 July 2014; http://www.yjc.ir/fa/print/4908729
50 Official website, Parliament of Iran; http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/legal_draft/state/814244
52 Ibid
54 Official site, Ministry of Culture and Guidance; http://www.farhang.gov.ir/fa/intro/duty
minorities recognized by the Constitution are allowed to form “religious minority societies” “comprised of volunteers from the same religion with the aim to work on religious, cultural, social and welfare issues of their own community.”\(^{55}\) The Office of Religious Minorities is charged with coordinating and overseeing all ceremonies held by religious minorities, including activities for the observance of religious holidays. Permission from the Ministry must be obtained in order to issue publications, and for foreign missionaries travel at the request of churches and religious councils.\(^{56}\)

47. Despite pronouncements that the procedure for issuing permission to construct mosques for Shias and Sunnis is non-discriminatory, Sunnis report that they have not been granted permission for the construction of a Mosque in Tehran since 1979,\(^{57}\) and authorities have also reportedly restricted the construction of Christian church buildings, including those of Orthodox Armenians and Assyrians for the past 35 years.\(^{58}\) Reports that the Government also continues to interdict Christian churches from holding Persian-language services also continue.\(^{59}\)

1. **Baha’is**

48. Despite statements from high-ranking officials that Baha’is are entitled to citizenship rights, they continue to face discrimination, arrest, and arbitrary detention in connection with their religion. Between September and December 2014, security forces in the cities of Isfahan, Tehran, Shiraz, Hamedan, Karaj and Semnan reportedly arrested at least 24 Baha’is, bringing the total number of Baha’is in detention to 100.

49. Discriminatory restrictions increased with regard to the burial of Baha’is in cemeteries across the country. Authorities in the city of Semnan have reportedly discouraged families from inscribing epitaphs on tombstones and inscriptions are restricted to first and last names, date of birth and death. Authorities have also restricted the construction of additional buildings to accommodate burials in the Semnan Baha’i cemetery. In at least three cases, Iranian authorities have also reportedly delayed the burial of Baha’is in the cities of Tabriz and Ahvaz.\(^{60}\)

50. Reports indicate that Baha’i students also faced discrimination in admission to the institutions of higher education 2014-2015 academic year. Shadan Shirazi, a Baha’i student who took the national mathematics exam, and placed 113\(^{th}\) out of an estimated million students, was reportedly barred from registering at public university. The Special Rapporteur invites Baha’i students to submit complaints of violations of their rights to the High Council for Human Rights.\(^{61}\)

51. Incitement against Baha’is also appeared to continue this past year. On 15 December 2014, Ayatollah Bojnourdi,(a high-ranking cleric and a former member of Supreme Judicial Council) stated “we never say that Baha’is have the right to education; Baha’is don’t even

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\(^{55}\) Official site, Parliament of Iran; http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90226  
\(^{57}\) International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, 17 January 2012; http://persian.iranthumanrights.org/1390/10/sunni_mps/  
\(^{59}\) Ibid  
\(^{60}\) Information submitted to the Special Rapporteur by the Baha’i Community in December 2014  
have citizenship rights.” After negative reactions, he later clarified that Baha’is who cooperate with Israel or advocate against Islam are not entitled to citizenship rights. They still have human rights but they cannot use privileges such as going to university in Iran.

2. Christians

52. As of 1 January 2015, at least 92 Christians remain in detention in the country allegedly due to their Christian faith and activities. In 2014 alone, 69 Christian converts were reportedly arrested and detained for at least 24 hours across Iran. Authorities reportedly continued to target the leaders of house churches, generally from Muslim backgrounds. Christian converts also allegedly continue to face restrictions in observing their religious holidays.

53. On 25 December, Iranian authorities reportedly raided a house church in the town of Rudehen and arrested nine individuals who had gathered to celebrate Christmas. Authorities also arrested Pastor Victor Beth Tamarz, the former head of the Shahrrara Assyrian Pentecostal Church in Tehran, along with two other Christian converts on 26 December while the Pastor was performing a Christmas service. Pastor Victor Beth Tamarz has reportedly been under pressure for performing Persian-language services since 2009.

54. On 19 October 2014, the Revolutionary Court of Alborz Province sentenced Pastors Behnam Irani, Reza Rabbani and Abdolreza (Mathias) Haghnejad to six years in prison on charges of “acting against national security” and “forming groups to overthrow the government.” Pastor Irani is currently serving a six year sentence in prison for “acting against national security” and “establishing illegal groups with the intention to overthrow the government.” The Government clarified that the Alborz Province’s Court of Appeal acquitted Mr. Haghnejad.

VI. Economic, social and cultural rights

A. Economic rights

1. Right to organize and collectively bargain

54. While a signatory to five of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) eight “core” Conventions, the Government has not yet signed either of the two ILO Conventions which deal specifically with the right to free expression and association (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention of 1948 and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949). The Government maintains that not acceding to these treaties have no impact rights or protections.

64 Ibid
65 Information submitted to the Special Rapporteur by Article18.
66 The Voice of Iranian Christians, http://vocir.org/2014/12/28/%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C%DB%88%AA-%D8%AA%D9%85%DB%8C%DB%88%AA-
67 Article 18; http://articleeighteen.com/fa/breaking-news/victor-bet-tamraz-arrested/
55. The Special Rapporteur positively notes that many labor groups have been permitted to advocate for their rights, including through ongoing actions by hundreds of workers at the Stephan Cement Company in Dizicheh, Isfahan Province, and by Yaz Khorramshahr Industry workers. However, respect for protections of rights exercised by labor activists remain capricious. The country’s 1990 Labour Act contains numerous progressive provisions with regard to workers’ rights themselves, but effectively excludes the right of workers to organize independently of Government supervision and control. The Act mandates that the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs oversee the “establishment, scope of duties, and functions” of labor groups and their representatives. These requirements and restrictions render activists who work peacefully without Government approval vulnerable to arrest and prosecution on “national security” charges.

56. In December 2014, at least three members of the Coordinating Committee to help form Workers’ Organizations in Iran were arrested during a demonstration, and at least 27 remain detained in relation to their exercise of rights protected under international law.

2. The plan to protect hijab and modesty and gender segregation in the workplace

57. On 8 October 2014, 36 members of Parliament submitted a “Plan to Protect Hijab and Modesty”. The Bill appears to impose further restrictions on women’s right to work. Article 5 of the bill limits women’s working hours from 7am to 10 pm and calls for gender segregation in the workplace. Some professions such as doctors, nurses or flight attendants are not subject to the work-hour restrictions under the Bill, and workplaces where the presence of women is necessary will be granted exceptions from segregation policies. The Bill also attempts to regulate workplace dress codes; mandating that employees in public or private sectors that do not meet Islamic standards for proper clothing could be penalized by pay check cuts up to 1/3 of their salary, for a minimum period of one month and maximum of one year.

58. On 30 August 2014, authorities stated that women are banned from working in coffee shops and that women requesting business permits for coffee shops should introduce men as their supervisors. A number of musical performances were also canceled in various cities across the country between August and December 2014 because women were participating. On 2 September 2014, Shargh newspaper reported that women couldn’t participate in musical performances in Isfahan and in 13 different provinces across the country. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance stated “when women who are observing Islamic Hijab are present and working in a healthy environment with men, there is no reason to ban their appearance on stage. We do not have any religious limitation against women’s performance.”

B. Right to health

1. Satellite jamming and its health impacts

59. Iranian authorities reportedly continue to prosecute individuals for the possession and use of satellite dishes. Over the past few months, Iranian officials have increasingly acknowledged the potential health concerns of satellite jamming, which the Government uses to block public access to certain television channels. In February 2014, Minister of Health Dr. Seyyed Hassan Ghazizadeh announced the formation of a special committee,
including representatives from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Information and Technology, and Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, to investigate the potential health effects of satellite jamming. The committee has yet to announce its findings. In October, Mr. Saeed Motassadi of the Department of the Environment also noted that “the topic of jamming causing cancer [has been] studied many times, and the possibility exists of this illness coming about in individuals as a result from the effects of jamming.”

2. Transgender Iranians

60. During its last review of Iran in 2013, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern “that members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community face discrimination with respect to access to employment, housing, education and health care, as well as social stigma and marginalization.”

61. The Special Rapporteur notes favorably that Iranian law and practice allows for transgender persons to undergo gender confirmation surgery. However, information received from victims, who underwent such surgeries, suggested that the quality of healthcare they received was at times, clearly substandard and not in line with professional norms or the right to adequate and attainable health provided in the ICCPR and ICESCR. Interviewees claimed that gender confirmation surgeries often led to serious complications, including severe bleeding, severe infection, scarring, chronic pain, and rectovaginal fistulas. Transgender Iranians also reported that their operations resulted in abnormally shaped or located sexual organs and vaginal stenosis.

62. There are reports that, licensed doctors gave patients a “discounted” rate for surgeries that ultimately deviated from standard procedures. These budget operations were allegedly conducted outside operating rooms, with limited anesthesia and post-operation care, and sometimes without genital reconstruction. Several transgender interviewees said these “discounted” surgeries were attractive, because it was difficult to access the costly surgical care, due to insufficient subsidies, and a lengthy pre-surgery bureaucratic process. The Special Rapporteur takes note that transgender persons must undergo gender confirmation operations in order to attain legal recognition of their gender in Iran, which may create undue pressure to undergo surgery.

C. Landmines

63. Concern over the situation of landmines in Iran was expressed during the country’s 2014 UPR. Reports indicate that the initial demining process has been accomplished, and

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73 Iran official says satellite jamming can cause cancer, 2 October 2014, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/iran-satellite-jamming-cancer.html#
74 E/C.12/IRN/CO/2
77 National Organization for Civil Registration, Article 20 (14); https://www.sabteahval.ir/default.aspx?tabid=81
that two million local residents have been educated about landmines and their risks. In April 2011, a member of the military maintained that approximately 85 percent of contaminated areas have been cleaned, that millions of undetonated landmines were destroyed, but that landmines buried in lower soil-strata and later uncovered by rain and erosion continue to pose a threat.

Since 2013, 89 civilians have reportedly faced landmine explosions, 12 of them allegedly under the age of 15. Eleven individuals in 2013 and nine in 2014 lost their lives due to “landmines and unexploded munitions.” In October 2013, the governor of Marivan, in the Kurdistan province, reported that seven children from the Neshkash village were injured as a result of a landmine explosion in a demined area that continues to face threats from landmines due to rain and landslides.

There have been complaints of insufficient risk education, particularly amongst children, and the shortcomings of state support programs for landmine victims. Some victims have characterized their experiences with support programs as prolonged and arbitrary, and maintained that some victims are deprived of support measures, because of vague criteria that govern the process for granting services.

In October 2014, a lawyer representing the child landmine victims in the Neshkash case informed the Office of the President about the failure of former local authorities to address the concerns of landmine victims and called for appropriate measures to address remaining threats, as well as support and treatment for the injured. In November 2014, a Parliamentarian from Kurdistan Province, (one of the five provinces reportedly affected by landmines from the Iran-Iraq war) expressed concern over the landmine victims’ access to medical care and pension. In its response, the Government has maintained that Parliament has ratified a law providing protection and support to the family of those returning to the country’s war-affected areas who “lose their lives or suffer injury” due to landmine explosions or “other unexploded ordinances.”

VII. Gender equality and women’s rights

Fifty-three recommendations related to the rights of women and girls were raised during the 2014 UPR. These recommendations touched on gender discrimination, early marriage, access to health and education, political and economic participation, and domestic violence. Several member states called on Iran to improve the status of women more generally in social, cultural, economic, and political affairs. Concerns previously expressed over gender inequality in law and practice persist. Recent legislative attempts made by the Iranian Parliament appear to further restrict the rights of women to their full and equal enjoyment of internationally recognized rights.

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81 Ibid
82 Reports of the Center for Supporters of Human Rights and Association of Human Rights in Kurdistan of Iran-Geneva (KMMK-G) submitted to the UN Special Rapporteur’s Office on 03 December 2014 and 06 February 2014.
83 Ibid
84 Ibid
A. Legislation affecting women

1. Family Population and Excellence Plan

68. In October 2014, a vote was postponed on the Family Excellence Plan, the purpose of the Bill being to encourage young people to marry and have children. On 21 October 2014, Ms. Mowlaverdi, the Vice President for Women and Family Affairs, opposed a provision in the Bill that prohibits hiring unmarried women as university faculty members, stating that such measures would not encourage marriage in society. Ms. Mowlaverdi added, the proposed bill was previously discussed in the Health Parliamentary Commission and that the Commission voted against Articles nine and ten, which impose a hierarchy for hiring based on gender and civil status and prohibit hiring unmarried women for faculty positions.

2. Protect Women against Violence” Bill

69. In its response to concerns raised by the Special Rapporteur in his 2014 report to the General Assembly about the prevalence of violence against women in the country and shortcomings in national laws and institutional framework for addressing the problem, the Iranian government maintained that domestic violence was a capital offence and noted that legislation to legally define all forms of domestic violence was being considered. It was announced on 29 November 2014 that the draft legislation to “Protect Women against Violence” had been submitted to the Administration’s Bills Commission. Ms. Mowlaverdi said her office had recommended that the Judiciary establish safe houses for abused women, in line with the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations on the matter.

70. Following the acid attacks on women Isfahan, the Administration announced its intent to work with the Judiciary to intensify punishment for such attacks. Authorities however prohibited protests against the attacks and in support of investigations, although on 24 October 2014, Parliamentarian, Abed Fatahi, from Urumiah defended the rights of protestors. Civil society actors, including Narsin Sotoudeh, Peyman Aref and Giti Pourfazel who participated in a demonstration to protest the attacks in front of the Interior Ministry in Tehran were arrested.

71. In similar attacks in the city of Jahrom in Fars province, at least six women, (mostly university students) were reportedly stabbed from behind and injured for their immodest attire. On 28 November 2014, the City Governor of Jahrom announced the arrest of a suspect. On 5 January 2015, the Court of First Instance sentenced the perpetrator to execution on charges of “moharebeh”.

89 A/69/356
90 http://aftabnews.ir/fa/news/267949/
91 Deutsch Welle news, 25 October 2014, http://www.dw.de/%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%8C-%DA%86%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-
B. Women in the budget

72. The proposed draft budget for March 2015-March 2016 increases resources for the Department of Women and Family Affairs by 87 percent (from 7.9 to 15 Billion Tomans).\(^93\) Fifteen billion toman has been allocated for insurance for female home-makers with priority given to female headed households.\(^94\)

VIII. Response from the Islamic Republic of Iran

73. In its response to the present report, the Government of Iran rejected a majority of the allegations communicated to the mandate-holder. It also objected to the Special Rapporteur’s identification of content in legislation currently under consideration as problematic; stating that is “a hasty intervention in the sovereign functions of the government” and not corresponding to the Code of Conduct” of the UN Special Procedures.

74. The Government communicated its support for some 65 percent of all recommendations received during Iran’s second Universal periodic Review, including many which it considers already implemented, either wholly, or in part. The Government also communicated its intention to reply to all outstanding communications; to continue meeting with the Special Rapporteur; and its plans to invite two Special Rapporteurs to Iran.

75. The Government also communicated its view that the Special Rapporteur’s approach to gathering information is flawed; stating that “we do not believe that simply visiting a number of European countries and writing a report with lengthy addendums just by having interviews with a limited number of persons is a right way to draft a dependable report.

76. The Special Rapporteur agrees that this approach to fact-finding is less than ideal, and reiterates his request for a visit to Iran itself. In the meantime, he will continue to gather information through interviews with Iranians located inside and outside the country in lieu of a country visit. The Special Rapporteur looks forward to ongoing meetings with the authorities to further discuss all possibilities for cooperation.

77. The Government also stated that no individuals are prosecuted “solely” for relations with the UN human rights mechanisms, “unless he/she commits an act that is regarded as a violation of law such as commission of criminal acts or security offenses.”

78. The Government maintained that Iranian laws provides death sentence for crimes that include large-scale trafficking of illicit drugs.” The Government also claim that Iranian laws shows “leniency” towards juvenile offenders through the use of a separate court system for children and by assessment of their capacity to understand their crimes.

79. The Government claimed that “no one has been arrested for exercising the right to take part in peaceful assembly,” and that the Islamic Penal Code does not currently prescribe punishment for political acts. The Government maintained, in contradiction to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’s findings, that no one in Iran is arbitrarily detained, and that all accused individuals are granted due process and fair trials in accordance with relevant domestic law. In this regard, the Government asserted that laws relating to judges’ conduct and the Bar Association ensure the independence of lawyer and judges.

\(^{93}\) The total proposed budget for the period between March 2015 to March 2015 is 219,000 Billion Tomans.

80. The Government also stated that “prisoners have acceptable levels of access to medical care both inside and outside prison. It informs that supervisory boards established by the Judiciary routinely visit prisons to ensure compliance with national standards. It also forwarded a welcomed announcement that the Government is currently considering accession to the UN Convention Against Torture.

81. The Government noted that laws protect expression “except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principle of Islam or the rights of the public.” It argues that imprisoned members of the media have committed “serious” offenses by propagating lies, “perturbing public peace of mind” and disseminating content that foment ethnic and religious hatred, extremism and violence.” It maintained that civil society actors are free and “extensively active,” adding that “any form of social activity” by “political party, society or association” requires a permit and the observance of laws and regulations.

82. With regard to religious freedom, the government also claimed that the most important criteria for constructing new places of worship is the number of followers of each faith, and that the Christian population have more than their per capita share of churches. It also stated that there is no restriction on Sunni Muslims to attend Shia mosques and vice versa which prevent spread of extremism in response to complaints that Sunni Muslims are not allowed to construct new places of worship.

83. The Government maintained that landmines in the five western provinces of the country have been planted by the former “regime of Iraq” during Iran-Iraq war and holds Iraq and “those countries that supported her in imposing war on Iran” to be responsible for the landmines. It maintained that the demining efforts require cooperation “with international organizations and other countries,” which “despite all our efforts” have led to no avail. In addition, the Government presented other challenges, including the shortage of “special demining equipment,” the universal difficulty of locating landmines below 30 centimeters, and sanctions that have “obstructed” the Government’s access to “some high technology” in this field.

84. The Government asserted its total rejection of “homosexual behaviors,” while highlighting its support for transgender individuals. In response to the sections on gender segregation policies the Government observed that “it is necessary to pay due attention to cultural and social grounds for this phenomenon. Observance of Islamic Hijab is mandatory according to our laws.”

IX. Conclusions and Recommendations

85. In his first interim report to the General Assembly in 2011, the Special Rapporteur highlighted that the outcome of the first cycle of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s UPR provided a “sound basis for collaboration between himself and the Iranian authorities.” He also stated that he would seek to contribute to the Government’s efforts to advance the 123 recommendations it accepted to implement. The Special Rapporteur’s reports since then have focused on the Government’s progress in addressing laws, policies, and practices identified by the international human rights mechanisms and during its 2010 UPR, and on identifying emerging problems.

86. The Special Rapporteur recognizes a number of Government efforts to implement the 2010 UPR commitments, but regrets that a majority of them remained unimplemented by 2014 and that underlying causes of violations highlighted during
the UPR and in his 2011 and biannual 2012, 2013, and 2014 reports remain
unaddressed. Concerns raised during the country’s 2014 UPR, and by repeated calls
by the United Nations human rights mechanisms to address violations of civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights reflect this reality.

87. The Special Rapporteur reiterates his firm belief that the Government could
significantly improve the country’s human rights situation by implementing
recommendations made during both UPR cycles, and by the Secretary-General, the
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Treaty Bodies, and the Special Procedures.
This includes reconsidering previously rejected recommendations to accede to the
Convention against Torture (CAT), the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the two ILO conventions related to
collective bargaining and the formation of unions.

88. High priority should be placed on amending laws and policies that undermine
or violate internationally recognized rights and standards, and that therefore diminish
the Government’s capacity to address concerns highlighted during the review and
presented in this, and other reports produced by the human rights mechanisms. Laws
that render activities legitimate rights under international law as offenses, including
those that restrict the press, criminalize expression, limit access to information and
give rise to the ongoing arrests of civil society actors and members of vulnerable
groups; including religious and ethnic minorities, and laws that apply the death
penalty to offenses not considered to be ‘most serious crimes’ under international law,
such as drug-trafficking, should be rescinded. Moreover, the mandatory use of the
death penalty is not compatible with the fair trial safeguards required under
international law for the application of the death penalty\footnote{See E/2010/10 for a detailed discussion on the relevant human rights jurisprudence.} and should be
reconsidered.

89. Authorities should immediately nullify the death sentences against all political
prisoners and prisoners of conscience, including that of Mr. Soheil Arabi and others,
whose alleged actions do not constitute a serious crime under international law. The
Government should also note that international law and consensus define juvenile
execution as the execution of individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of
the commission of the relevant crime, not at the time of implementation of the
sentence. He reiterates his call on the Government to officially ban this practice and
align its practices with it obligations under international law. He repeats his call to
enforce a complete moratorium on the death penalty in the meantime. These actions
could drastically reduce executions for non-capital offenses, and better ensure
protections for the right to life.

90. The Government should also expedite the removal of landmines and explosives
that continue to pose a threat to the lives and security of populations located in their
vicinity, enhance provisions for public education -- particularly for at risk children --
and ensure immediate and non-discriminatory access to adequate medical treatment
and pension programs for victims and their families.\footnote{In areas where landmines pose a threat to the safety of children, investment must be made to ensure the complete clearing of landmines and cluster-bombs from all affected areas”, General Comment 17 on article 31 of CRC,http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=CRC/C/GC/17}

91. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the release of political prisoners and
prisoners of conscience, but remains concerned about the initial cause for their
prosecution. He echoes the renewed concern of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights defenders about the Government’s “overly broad
interpretations” of national security and propagation against the State. He calls on the authorities to release all individuals identified by the WGAD as being arbitrarily detained, as well as other political prisoners and prisoners of conscience.  

92. The Special Rapporteur further regrets the difficult situation of recognized and unrecognized religious minorities, and that communities continue to report arrests and prosecution for worship and participation in religious community affairs, including in private homes. He urges the authorities to recognize that freedom of religion or belief entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, and that measures restricting eligibility for civil, political, social or economic privileges, or imposing special restrictions on the practices or manifestations of the beliefs of other faiths violate the prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief and the guarantee of equal protection under article 26 of the ICCPR.  

93. The Government should amend laws and policies, and reconsider draft legislation that infringes on the right to freely associate and assemble with expressive groups or like-minded individuals, or to promote peaceful ideals and activities. Non-governmental organizations, including unregistered associations, should be allowed to function freely, and their members should be able to operate in a safe environment. The Special Rapporteur echoes the recommendation made by the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association that the establishment of associations should be facilitated by a “notification procedure” that is “simple, easily accessible, non-discriminatory, and non-onerous or free of charge.” Furthermore, the right to peaceful assembly “should not be subject to prior authorization by the authorities, but at the most to a prior notification procedure, which should not be burdensome,” but the Government should also recognize spontaneous assemblies as “exempted from prior notification.”  

94. The Special Rapporteur looks forward to observing the impact that amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedures will have on improving access to legal counsel, and encourages the Government to guarantee this right for all accused, regardless of allegations against them. He notes that the Government should further ensure that national laws support the independence of lawyers, in accordance with international norms and standards, and implores Iran to release all lawyers that appear to have been imprisoned for protected activities in defense of their clients, such as raising awareness about fair trial concerns.  

95. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the prosecution of Mr. Saeed Mortazavi for his role in facilitating illegal detentions, but notes that such investigations and rulings appear to be exceedingly rare, especially when compared with the high volume of similar reports about arbitrary detentions, torture and ill-treatment of detainees emanating from the country. He calls on the authorities to prosecute and appropriately sentence all officials found responsible for the torture and ill-treatment of detainees, in line with Iranian and international law. He also encourages the Government to address substandard detention conditions previously identified by the human rights mechanisms, as well as in this and previous reports or that may have

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98 A/HRC/25/55/Add.3  
99 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993)  
100 A/HRC/20/27  
101 Ibid  
102 Ibid  
103 CCPR/C/GC/32, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32
been identified by its own audit. He further implores the Government to ensure adequate access to medical treatment in line with international standards.

96. The Special Rapporteur further calls on the Government to amend laws that violate the rights of women, or that undermine their full enjoyment of civil political, social, and economic rights, including the right to work and to freedom from discrimination, especially in education and the workplace. Draft legislation currently under consideration that appears to infringe on these rights raises serious concern, and should be reconsidered.

97. The Special Rapporteur encourages the Government to consider ending its satellite jamming given its impact on the health of its citizens, and on the right to access to information. He also calls for the enhancement of policies that govern gender confirmation surgeries for transgender individuals to ensure the protection of the right to health of those who may consider such procedures.

98. The 2014 UPR offers all stakeholders an opportunity to reflect on previous efforts to promote respect for human rights in Iran and provides a platform to explore opportunities to ameliorate the current situation. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur will use the outcome of the country’s 2014 UPR as a basis for collaboration between himself and the Iranian authorities, and he will continue to seek cooperation in the form of dialogue and visits to the country to further assess the situation. He also encourages the Government to consider committing to a voluntary midterm review that may contribute to its ability to advance the pledges that it may undertake at the outcome of its second UPR in March 2015.
Annexes

Annex I

[English only]

Supplementary and Additional Information

2015 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN Human Rights Council

I. Introduction

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran will provide responses to recently proposed Universal Periodic Review (UPR) recommendations during the 28th Session of the Human Rights Council in March 2015.

2. In its Reply to the Draft of the present Report, the Government noted its participation in — and support for — the 20th Session of the UPR in October 2014. The Government also suggested its support for about 65 per cent of all new recommendations received, including many, which it considers already implemented, either in all or in part.

3. In its Reply, the Government also claimed that the quantity of recommendations it accepts is a “sovereign” issue, and that analysis of such by the Special Rapporteur in the present Report is a “deviation” from his Code of Conduct.

II. Methodology

4. In its Reply, the Government reiterated its belief that the existence of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur is politically motivated and illegitimate.

5. The Government also repeated its belief that the Special Rapporteur’s reports have failed to properly reflect the Government’s responses and communications, and criticized the Special Rapporteur’s reports as containing “holistic and vague allegations,” and using “general and cliché phrases.”

6. It also criticized the relatively short amount of time allotted by the UN for its responses to Draft Reports.

7. Moreover, the Government criticized the present Report for considering proposed legislation prior to its adoption as law.

III. Cooperation with the mandate holder

8. Despite its rejection of the basis of the mandate, the Government, in its reply, pledged to continue meeting with the Special Rapporteur in New York and Geneva, and repeated a past announcement that there are plans to invite two Special Procedures mandate holders to Iran.
IV. Reprisals against activists (cases reported since June 2014)

9. On 2 June 2014, Mr. Saeed Shirzad, a child rights activist, was reportedly detained and sent to Ward 209 of Evin Prison without access to a lawyer or contact with family. While no public or formal indictment has been issued against Mr. Shirzad, in August 2014 he was reportedly verbally informed of his charges, which include “assembly and collusion” and “propaganda against the system.” Authorities have allegedly justified these charges, in part, by claiming that Mr. Shirzad was in contact with the Special Rapporteur.

10. In September 2014 Mr. Mohammad Reza Pourjashari, who was originally released on 23 August 2014 after completing a four-year sentence for “propaganda against the system” and “insulting the Supreme Leader,” was re-arrested. Authorities allegedly accused him of attempting to illegally cross the border and of maintaining “contact” with foreign nationals. Mr. Pourjashari was reportedly also accused of contact with the Special Procedures during his arrest and subsequent investigation. Reports indicate that members of his family have since been summoned for questioning by authorities. On 7 February 2015, Mr. Pourjashari reportedly embarked on a hunger strike to protest the lack of clarity surrounding his detention.

11. On 21 September 2014, Ms. Atena Daemi, a human rights activist who has worked on children’s issues, was reportedly arrested by the IRGC (Revolutionary Guards), and has since been detained in Ward 209 of Evin Prison. Although official charges — if any — against her remain unclear, she is reportedly facing charges of “propaganda against the system,” “acting against national security,” and maintaining “illegal contact with foreigners.” She has reportedly been specifically accused by investigating authorities of communicating with the Special Rapporteur.

12. On 25 October 2014, Mr. Mohammad Ali Taheri, a spiritual leader, proponent of alternative methods of healing, and the founder of the Erfan e-Halqeh (inter-universalism) movement, embarked on a hunger strike to protest his detention conditions and the impending addition of the capital charge of efsad fel-arz (“corruption on Earth”) to his case file. Mr. Taheri is currently serving a five-year prison sentence for “blasphemy” and was also convicted of “improperly touching [the wrists]” of female patients, “interfering in medical sciences,” earning illegitimate funds, distributing audio-visual materials, and improperly using medical titles. Mr. Taheri’s new charge is reportedly related, in part, to authorities’ claim that he has attempted contact with the Special Rapporteur. Mr. Taheri is reportedly in poor health, due in part to his recent hunger strikes. He was apparently moved to a slightly improved cell in late November, after which point he shifted to a partial hunger strike, but authorities continue to hold him in solitary confinement, as they have since his initial detention in 2011. Mr. Taheri’s trial is scheduled for 25 February 2015 at Branch 26 of Tehran’s Revolutionary court based on the charge of efsad fel-arz (“corruption on Earth”). According to Mr. Alizadeh Tabataba’ei, Mr. Taheri’s lawyer, “Mr. Taheri was initially charged with ‘corruption on Earth’ during his first trial in 2011, but the court changed the charge to ‘blasphemy’ and sent [the original charge] back to the Office of Prosecutor for further investigation. Recently, [that charge] has been returned to the court.”

13. Mr. Behnam Ebrahimzadeh, a child and labor rights activist who was originally arrested in connection with his activities in June 2010, was reportedly forcibly taken to court on 3 December 2014 (after having previously refused to attend his court session) and accused by authorities of contacting the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council as well as an opposition group. Mr. Ebrahimzadeh was sentenced to an additional 9.5 years in

http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/647556
prison on several charges, including “assembly and collusion against the system” and “propaganda against the system.” He was already serving the fourth of a five-year sentence for “assembly, collusion, and propaganda against the system.” He was then transferred to Section 2 of Raja’i Shahr Prison, which reportedly houses violent criminals, and was forced to sleep on the floor. Mr. Ebrahimzadeh has also reportedly embarked on multiple hunger strikes, including one in December 2014, to protest prison conditions as well as his inability to obtain furlough to attend to the medical needs of his son Nima, who has leukemia.

14. Mr. Hadi Esmaeilzadeh, a former member of the Defenders of Human Rights Centre (DHRC) who was reportedly convicted in July 2014 for “propaganda against the system” through membership in an “illegal organization” and “assembly and collusion against the system.” Apparently he was recently accused by authorities for communicating with the UN Human Rights Council.105

15. In its reply to the Draft of this Report, the Government of Iran denied that individuals are prosecuted “solely” for relations with UN human rights mechanisms, “unless he/she commits an act that is regarded as a violation of law such as commission of criminal acts or security offenses.”

V. Overview of civil and political rights

A. Right to life

16. On 24 September 2014, authorities confirmed the execution of Mr. Mohsen Amir Aslani, who was originally convicted in 2007 on charges including “heresy,” “immoral acts,” and insulting Jonah, an Islamic prophet. Mr. Aslani, a psychologist and religious teacher by background, had apparently implied in one of his classes that it may not have been physically possible for Jonah to have been eaten by a whale and then to have escaped from the belly of that same whale, as certain religious traditions hold. Iranian authorities claim that Mr. Aslani was hanged for committing rape,106 and not for insulting this religious figure. In an open letter family members have disputed the bases of this charge, highlighting potential discrepancies in timing and inconsistencies in evidence offered by authorities.

17. On 25 October 2014, authorities executed Ms. Reyhaneh Jabbari, despite repeated calls for the stay of her execution107 by international human rights organizations, including UN human rights mechanisms. Ms. Jabbari was convicted of murdering a man she claimed had tried to sexually assault her prior to the incident in question. Concerns were raised about due process and fair trial violations in the case. Under Iranian law, the family of the victim of a murder is entitled to retaliatory action (“qisas”). The family of the murdered individual in this case refused to pardon Ms. Jabbari, and officials did not override this decision. Judicial authorities have claimed that Ms. Jabbari was granted a fair trial, as evidenced by the length of time of her appeals process; and that they attempted in good faith, but without success, to convince the “heirs of the blood” to pardon her.

18. In its reply to the Draft Report, the Government reiterated its achievements in combating drug trafficking, and also claimed that it consistently seeks to minimize the implementation of the death penalty. The Government highlighted what it describes as a

105 https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/asia/iran/15703-iran-sentencing-of-mr-hadi-esmaeilzadeh-to-a-total-of-four-years-of
106 http://iranhr.net/2014/09/mohsen-amir-aslani-executed-this-morning/
lack of “international consensus” regarding the abolition the death penalty, but did not directly address the fact that neither executions for drug trafficking nor juvenile executions are permissible by international consensus.

19. On or around 20 February 2015, Mr. Saman Naseem, a juvenile offender, was seemingly executed, although authorities have not yet confirmed this.108 Mr. Nasim was arrested on 17 July 2011 at the age of seventeen for allegedly engaging in an armed conflict that led to the death of a member of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. While detained by the Intelligence Ministry, he was reportedly tortured and forced to sign a confession while wearing a blindfold. It was reported that interrogators pulled out his finger and toe nails and beat him on his back, legs, and abdomen. In January 2012, he was sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court of Mahabad on charges of moharebeh (sometimes translated as “enmity with God” and sometimes as “drawing a weapon to the populace with intent to instill fear”) and efsad fel-arz (“corruption on earth”). The Supreme Court overturned the conviction stating the Revolutionary Court lacked jurisdiction to try Mr. Naseem as he was less than 18 years old at the time of the alleged offense. A retrial was held in April 2013 where Branch Two of the Criminal Court of the West Azerbaijan Province sentenced Mr. Naseem to death without reference to the Supreme Court holding. In December 2013, the Supreme Court reportedly upheld Mr. Naseem’s execution sentence.109 In its reply to the Draft Report, the Government confirmed that Mr. Naseem was tried at Branch 2 of the Criminal Court based on charges of “armed action against the Islamic Republic of Iran country by membership in banned PJAK terrorist group and taking part in an armed terrorist attack against military forces that caused the death and injury of a number of military personnel.” The Government stated there were five judges presiding over the trial, and it was after hearing “defense arguments by him and his lawyers and exhaustion of all legal remedies” that Mr. Naseem was sentenced to death. In November 2014, head of the Judiciary Mr. Sadegh Amoli Larijani defended the practice of executing juvenile offenders once they come of age: “[The allegation of] the execution of juveniles [in Iran] under the age of 18 [is] completely false. We, however, don’t have a reason to ignore the heirs to the blood right of qisas [retribution in kind] when a person that was 17.5 years old at the time of the crime turns 25.”110

20. In December 2014, in addition to Mr. Naseem, authorities had allegedly threatened other prisoners awaiting execution in Urumia Prison with expediting the implementation of their sentences in retaliation for participating in the hunger strike: Messrs. Ali Afshari, Habib Afshari, Behrouz Alkhani, Mohammad Abdollahi, Sayed Sami Hosseini, Sayed Jamal Mohammadi, Sirwan Nejavi, Ebrahim Rezapour, and Ali Ahmad Soleiman.111

21. On 18 February 2015, Messrs. Younes Aghayan, Habibollah Afshari, Ali Afshari, Sirwan Najavi, and Ebrahim Shapouri were reportedly transferred from Urumia Prison to an unknown location.112

22. Messrs. Ali and Habib Afshari had been arrested in December 2010 in the West Azerbaijan Province and transferred to Mahabad and Urumia Detention Centers, where

108 http://iranhr.net/2015/02/saman-naseem-was-executed-yesterday/
110 Statement - November 2014.
112 Iran Human Rights submission to the office of the Special Rapporteur on 20 February 2015, http://iranhr.net/2015/02/unofficial-report-saman-naseem-was-executed-yesterday/
they were allegedly held incommunicado for four months, interrogated, and tortured.113 Ali and Habib Afshari were reportedly charged with moharebeh (sometimes translated as “enmity with God” and sometimes as “drawing a weapon to the populace with intent to instill fear”) through “propaganda” activities and membership in a State opposition party.114 On 5 December 2011, they were tried at the Mahabad Revolutionary Court, and were reportedly informed on 16 January 2012 that they had been sentenced to death. The Supreme Court has since upheld the sentence.115 On 22 April 2014, their execution sentences were reportedly communicated to Urumia Prison’s Office for the Implementation of Sentences.116 Throughout the entire judicial process they were allegedly not allowed to choose their lawyer and instead were assigned court-appointed representation.117

B. Fair trial standards

23. In its Reply, the Government maintained that all accused individuals are granted the full right to a fair trial, due to the existence of — and in accordance with — due process laws.

24. On 4 January 2015, Iranian authorities reportedly arrested 33 Baluchi residents of Sarbaz Village (Sistan and Baluchistan Province), in relation to recent incidents in the area. These incidents include the reported deaths of Messrs. Issa Shahraki and Adham Sabouri on 1 January 2015, which some officials described as criminal or terrorist acts. On 21 February 2015, the families of Messrs. Edris Baladehee, Amin Raeesi, Omid Bahram-zehi, Bashir Baladehee, Abu Bakr Molazehi, Sattar Bahram-zehi, Amin, Yousef Bahram-zehi, Amer Gahram-zehi, and Davoud Bahram-zehi wrote a letter to the UN Secretary General and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran stating their family members were detained incommunicado over the previous few months. In their letter, they rejected authorities’ allegations and expressed concern regarding the detainees’ alleged lack of access to lawyers and fair trials. The family members pointed out the contradictions in the “official” account of events and provided an alibi for each person and demanded their release. Relatives and friends of Messrs. Mosayeb Vatankhah and Farhad Bahram-zehi, who were also reportedly amongst the group initially arrested, have voiced similar concerns to authorities and UN officials.

C. Freedom from arbitrary detention

25. Between 2012 and 2014, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) issued ten opinions regarding the detention of 13 Iranians. They include the aforementioned opposition leaders along with several journalists, lawyers, a Christian pastor, and a student activist. The Government only responded to three of the WGAD’s ten communications. In its Opinions, the WGAD concluded that all individuals appear to have been detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, opinion, religion, belief, or association, and encouraged the government to immediately release individuals charged with peacefully exercising fundamental freedoms and to compensate them for their arbitrary detention. Ms.

http://www.iranthumanrights.org/2012/02/kurdish-brothers/
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http://www.iranthumanrights.org/2012/02/kurdish-brothers/
http://www.iranthumanrights.org/2012/02/kurdish-brothers/
http://www.iranthumanrights.org/2012/02/kurdish-brothers/
Nasrin Sotudeh, was released prior to the expiration of her sentence, and Mr. Bahman Ahmadi Amouee and Mr. Kiarash Kamrani were released following the completion of their sentences. None of the other individuals has been release or compensated, as recommended by the WGAD.

26. Green Movement leaders and former presidential candidates Mr. Mehdi Karoubi and Mr. Mir Hossein Mousavi, along with Ms. Zahra Rahnavard, Mr. Mousavi’s wife, have been under house arrest since February 2011. On 29 August 2012, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) issued an Opinion concerning the case and stated that the Iranian government did not only violate “international human rights laws, but also Iranian laws on the subject” by detaining them. The WGAD judged the deprivation of their liberty to be arbitrary and requested that the Government release them and accord them with “an enforceable right to compensation.” In February 2013, the Special Rapporteur joined the Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association in a statement calling for their immediate and unconditional release.

27. Messrs. Karoubi and Mousavi and Ms. Rahvanard have called on authorities to grant them a public trial by a competent court, in accordance with the Constitution. Parlimentarian Mr. Ali Motahari has also repeatedly called on Government officials to address the house arrest. On 7 October 2014, Mr. Motahari declared the house arrest to be without judicial warrant and unconstitutional. In addition, he criticized the comments of officials who predicted, prior to due process of law, that the sentence would be heavy, or possibly execution. Mr. Motahari also called for a public trial-by-jury, in accordance with the Constitution, and for the “punishment” of officials responsible for the continuation of the house arrest. He maintained that the President, who is also the head of the Supreme National Security Council, is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution. An administration spokesperson responded by stating that it is “not indifferent” toward this issue, but no action has yet been taken.

28. On 31 December 2014, the head of Judiciary, Mr. Sadegh Larijani, declared the house arrest to be constitutional and in accordance with the Supreme National Security Council Act. According to Mr. Larijani, the Judiciary has two considerations in deciding whether to hold a trial in this case: a Supreme National Security Council Act regarding the house arrest of “seditionists” (a term used by some officials to describe the post-2009 presidential election protesters) leaders and “the explicit comments of some seditious agents stating that they do not care about the outcome of any trial, and just want a platform to have their say.” Family members are reportedly concerned regarding the conditions of the house arrest and the lack of medical care available to the individuals.

29. Reports surfaced that the Prosecutor’s Office allegedly pledged the furlough of Mr. Abdolfattah Soltani if his family posted bail of one-billion toman. The family attempted to post the bail in August 2014, yet the Prosecutor’s Office failed to grant the furlough. On 19 November 2012, the WGAD adopted an Opinion concerning Mr. Abdolfattah Soltani,

http://www.kaleme.com/1393/10/06/klm
http://sahamnews.org/1393/09/271326/
human rights lawyer and co-founder of the Defenders of Human Rights Centre (DHRC), deeming the deprivation of his liberty to be “arbitrary” and encouraged the Government to “take necessary steps to remedy the situation, which include his immediate release.” Mr. Soltani was reportedly arrested on 10 September 2011, and on 4 March 2012 the Revolutionary Court sentenced him to 18 years in prison and a 20-year ban from practicing law on charges of “forming or running a group or association outside or inside the country which seeks to undermine the security of the country,” “assembly and collusion against national security,” “propaganda against the system,” and “earning illegitimate assets.” On appeal the sentence was reduced to 13 years imprisonment. Mr. Soltani is currently serving his sentence. He has reportedly contracted numerous illnesses and suffers from heart complications. Despite his ongoing medical issues, to date, he has been deprived of furlough or access to specialized health care outside prison.

30. In September 2014, Ayatollah Kazemeyni-Boroujerdi was reportedly threatened with execution if he continued to author letters while detained. Mr. Boroujerdi’s physical health is reportedly deteriorating and he suffers from diabetes, asthma, Parkinson’s disease, kidney and heart problems, and collapses frequently. In February 2014, prison medical staff reportedly said he required hospitalization outside of the prison. During his eight years in prison, Ayatollah Boroujerdi has been hospitalized on three occasions. Mr. Boroujerdi, a dissident Shi’a cleric and was arrested in 2006 due to his advocacy of the separation of religion and state. In 2007 he was given the death sentence by a Special Clerical Court. The death sentence was later reduced to an 11 year prison sentence.

31. Student activist Mr. Arash Sadeghi was reportedly arrested at his office on 6 September 2014 and has since been held in Ward 2A of Evin Prison. Mr. Sadeghi was previously released from prison in 2013 after serving time for “propaganda against the system” and “assembly and collusion against the state.”

32. In December 2014, Mr. Amir Hekmati, in an open letter, appealed to the head of the Judiciary and the Intelligence Minister regarding “lack of progress” on his case and threatened to embark on hunger strike in protest. On 23 December 2014, Mr. Hekmati temporarily suspended the hunger strike that he began on 18 December after Evin Prison officials agreed to take measures with the “appropriate Iranian government authorities” to revisit the case. Mr. Amir Hekmati, who was reportedly arrested in August 2011 when visiting relatives in Iran from the United States, was initially sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court on charges of “cooperation with an enemy State,” “membership in the CIA,” moharebeh (sometimes translated as “enmity with God”) and sometimes as “drawing a weapon to the populace with intent to instill fear”), and mosbed fel-arz (“corruption on earth”) in January 2012. The sentence was overturned by the Supreme Court in March 2012 and the case was ordered to retrial. Mr. Hekmati has maintained the charges to be based “solely on confessions obtained by force, threats, miserable prison conditions, and prolonged periods of solitary confinement.” In April 2014, Mr. Hekmati was reportedly sentenced to 10 years in prison, a sentence which is currently being appealed. In 2013, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) deemed Mr. Hekmati’s detention arbitrary and called for his immediate release.

129 http://en.iranwire.com/features/6204/
133 http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/08/amir-hekmati-3/
33. In October 2014, Branch 36 of the Iranian Supreme Court accepted a request for the retrial of academic and scientist Mr. Omid Kokabee. Mr. Kokabee was a post-doctoral student at the University of Texas at Austin in the United States at the time of his arrest in January 2011. He initially was charged and sentenced for “cooperating with enemy state[s].” The Supreme Court overturned this conviction on the basis that the Islamic Republic of Iran is not officially at war with any other country. The Special Rapporteur welcomed the Supreme Court decision and echoed the hope of dozens of Nobel Laureates, expressed in an open letter dated September 2014, advocating for Mr. Kokabee’s immediate and unconditional release. In December 2014, 161 Iranian academics also signed a petition calling for urgent medical attention and judicial review of Mr. Kokabee’s case. In January 2015, Branch 54 of the Tehran Appeals Court re-confirmed his original sentence, disregarding the Supreme Court’s prior ruling, and, according to Mr. Kokabee’s lawyer, contravening established procedures regarding cases, overturned by the Supreme Court. Advocates for Mr. Kokabee claim that his detention is based, partially on his refusal to work for an organization within the Iranian security apparatus.

34. In February 2015, Azerbaijani rights activist Mr. Ali Reza’i was arrested. At the time of this writing, his whereabouts or charges — if any — were unknown.  

D. Independence of lawyers

35. In October 2010, human rights defender and cofounder of the Defenders of Human Rights Center (DHRC), Mr. Mohammad Seifzadeh was sentenced by the Revolutionary Court to nine years in prison and banned him from practicing law for ten years for “acting against national security through establishing the Defenders of Human Rights Center.” Mr. Seifzadeh was also reportedly arrested in April 2011 in Urmia (West Azerbaijan Province) for allegedly attempting to exit the country illegally, apparently leading to a second case against him. It was reported that an Appeals Court eventually reduced his 2010 sentence from nine-years to two-years. Mr. Seifzadeh served his two-year sentence until 25 March 2013 where prior to the completion of his sentence, a third case was brought against him. In March 2013, Mr. Seifzadeh was charged with “assembly and collusion against the system” for reportedly “writing critical letters to former President Khatami and for signing several group statements while in prison.” It is claimed that his letter included allegations of rights violations within the judicial system. The additional six-year sentence was reportedly confirmed in October 2013. On 8 January 2015, Ms. Fatemeh Golzar, Mr. Seifzadeh’s wife, reported that he is in need of urgent medical care. Physicians at the Rajae’i Shahr Prison Infirmary have reportedly confirmed that he requires an ultrasound to investigate complaints of kidney pain. To date he has not been granted access to appropriate medical treatment.

36. On 6 August 2014, it was reported that Mr. Massoud Shafiee, a human rights lawyer who represented three American hikers that were detained in Iran in 2009 on charges of “espionage” and “illegal entry” into the country, currently faces a foreign travel ban and pressure by authorities. Six days after the release of two of the hikers on 21 September 2011, security forces conducted a search of Mr. Shafiee’s home and detained him in Evin Prison where he was allegedly interrogated for several hours regarding representation of the hikers and another case involving union activists Mr. Reza Shahabi and Mr. Rasoul Bodaghi. Mr. Shafiee reportedly attempted to leave the country the following week. His passport was allegedly confiscated at the airport and he was informed of a foreign travel

135 http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2013/04/seifzadeh_reversal/
ban placed against him. His potential clients also reportedly face pressure by authorities to cancel agreements retaining him as their attorney.136

37. On 18 October 2014, Branch 2 of the Lawyers’ Disciplinary Court at the Iranian Bar Association, allegedly under pressure from Intelligence agencies, banned Ms. Nasrin Sotoudeh from practicing law for three years. Ms. Sotoudeh began an indefinite sit-in on 21 October 2014 at the Bar Association in Tehran to protest the ruling, and in protest of the general state of legal representation in Iran. She was arrested and detained for a few hours on 25 October and again on 10 December 2014.137 Ms. Sotoudeh was originally sentenced to six years in prison on charges of spreading “propaganda against the system” and “acting against national security” in September 2010 and was released without formal pardon or furlough on 18 September 2013.

38. In September 2010 Ms. Sotoudeh was charged and sentenced to six years in prison for spreading “propaganda against the system” and “acting against national security.” She was released without formal pardon or furlough on 18 September 2013. Allegedly, under pressure from intelligence agencies, on October 18 2014, Branch 2 of the Lawyers Disciplinary Court at the Iranian Bar Association sentenced Ms. Sotoudeh to a three-year ban from practicing law. On 21 October 2014 Ms. Sotoudeh began a sit-in in protest of her sentence and the general state of the Iranian legal profession. She was arrested and detained for a few hours on both 25 October 2014 and 10 December 2014.138

E. Detention conditions and treatment of prisoners

i. Inadequate segregation and access to medical treatment: Urumia, Minab Evin, Tabriz Rajae’i Shahr, Karoun, Dezful, Yasouj, and Evin Prisons

39. Ward 8 of Evin Prison is reportedly overcrowded and prisoners allegedly suffer from unsanitary conditions and poor nutrition. The maximum prisoner capacity for Ward 8 is 500, but at least 800 individuals are reportedly detained there. The lack of space forces many prisoners to sleep on the floor and in the hallways.

40. Many prisoners are reportedly deprived of their right to receive proper medical treatment in medical clinics and hospitals outside the prison despite urgently needing medical care. In 2013 the Supreme Leader endorsed Eid Al-Fitr (“Amnesty Pledge”) which was drafted by the Head of the Judiciary. The Pledge stated that the remaining sentences of prisoners diagnosed by the Medical Examiner Office’s Commission as suffering from serious chronic diseases would be pardoned.139 However, despite the Pledge, many prisoners diagnosed as suffering from serious chronic diseases remain incarcerated.

41. In November 2014, prisoners at Minab (Hormozgan Province) and Urmia (West Azerbaijan Province) Prisons embarked on hunger strikes, calling for immediate access to medical care, and for the separation of prisoners by crimes committed. Prisoners were also reportedly protesting alleged threats to expedite the implementation of the execution sentences of several protesters — including the death sentence of convicted juvenile

136 http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/08/shafiee/
139 http://isna.ir/fa/news/92051709891
42. On 20 November 2014, at least 24 Kurdish prisoners in Ward 12 of Urmia Central Prison (in the West Azerbaijan Province) reportedly began a hunger strike protesting the insufficient segregation of prisoners that committed civil crimes from those that committed violent ones. Reportedly, prisoners who participated in the hunger strike were summoned to the Intelligence Office and threatened with new charges, transfer to solitary confinement, and with having family members arrested. On 9 December 2014, the Prison’s special guard forces allegedly surrounded Ward 12 and threatened to attack the prisoners if they continued the hunger strike.

43. As of 16 December 2014, 27 prisoners at Urmia Prison were reportedly on hunger strike. On 22 December 2014, 26 of the prisoners reportedly ended their hunger strike after prison authorities committee to address their demands, including separating prisoners according to crime committed and to stop harassing prisoners’ family members. Mr. Masoud Shamsinejad, a Kurdish human rights lawyer, had joined the strike on 10 December 2014. In its response to the Draft Report, the Government maintained Mr. Shamsinejad’s sentence was in accordance with provisions of the Islamic Penal Code dealing with “propaganda,” “activities against the Government” (Articles 19 and 211). In addition, the Government stated that denial of Mr. Shamsinejad’s petition for appeal was in compliance with the Penal code (Article 500). Thus, there was no infringement upon his due process rights.

44. Two of the prisoners on hunger strike, Mr. Jafar Mirzaei and Mr. Arafat Asghari, were reportedly also released from prison upon completion their six-month sentences. Mr. Mansour Arvand, a Kurdish prisoner awaiting execution, was reportedly transferred to Mahabad Prison.

45. Mr. Reza Rasouli, reportedly began a hunger strike on 11 November 2014 protesting Urmia Prison’s insufficient medical care. He remained on hunger strike for 49 days. Mr. Rasouli’s health is deteriorating and he is in critical condition. He suffers from bronchitis, a pelvic tumor, osteoporosis, bruised legs, and a lung infection. Prison authorities reportedly agreed to transfer him to a hospital.

46. The health condition of Mr. Afshin Sohrabzadeh, a Kurdish prisoner from the Kermanshah province imprisoned in exile at Minab Prison (Hormozgan Province), is also reportedly in critical condition. Prison physicians have reportedly diagnosed Mr. Sohrabzadeh with cancer requiring urgent care. On 9 November 2014, Mr. Sohrabzadeh was reportedly found unconscious and taken to a hospital in Minab. His physician requested Mr. Sohrabzadeh’s immediate transfer to a properly equipped hospital in Bandar Abbas. Prison officials at the Minab Prosecutor's Office allegedly rejected the request, compelled the hospital to release him, and denied him medical furlough. It was reported that Mr. Sohrabzadeh went on hunger strike to protest the officials’ conduct and the denial of his medical care upon his return to prison. On the fifth day of his hunger strike, he reportedly was put in solitary confinement at Minab Prison and asked to end his hunger strike. Although Mr. Sohrabzadeh reportedly ended his strike on 12 December 2014, concern remains over his health condition and access to medical care. It is also noted that on 3 July 2013, Mr. Sohrabzadeh reportedly attempted suicide in protest of his transfer from the Sanandaj Central Prison to exile in Minab Prison.

47. Mr. Ali Moradi, another Kurdish prisoner-in-exile at Minab Prison, suffers from heart disease. Mr. Moradi objected to the delay in Mr. Sohrabzadeh’s medical treatment. In response, prison authorities allegedly beat Mr. Moradi and place him in solitary confinement, where he was reportedly kept for 22 days.

48. Authorities allegedly also threatened Messrs. Ali Afshari, Mohammad Abdollahi, and Saman Nasim, who were all awaiting execution, that they would expedite the implementation of their sentences if they continued with their hunger strike. On 10 December, Intelligence officials allegedly requested Saman Nasim’s family to demand he end his hunger strike, or else have his execution sentence immediately implemented.141

49. Ms. Bahareh Hedayat, a former member of the Central Council and Spokesperson for the nationwide student organization Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat, was sentenced to ten years in prison (she received 9.5 years in July 2010 and an additional 6 months in November 2011)142 on charges of “insulting the Supreme Leader,” “insulting the President,” and “acting against national security and publishing falsehoods.” Ms. Hedayat is currently serving her sentence in the women’s ward of Evin Prison. She reportedly suffers from serious gynecological medical conditions. Doctors reportedly believe that if her treatment is delayed, she may become infertile. Ms. Hedayat reportedly underwent surgery related to these issues during her last medical furlough, on 27 July 2014. However, due to alleged refusal by the Office of Prosecutor to extend her furlough, Ms. Hedayat was forced to return to prison on the same day, immediately following her surgery, without receiving necessary post-surgical care.

50. On 20 August 2012, Judge Salavati sentenced the group “Human Rights Activists in Iran” to five years and six months in prison on charges of “assembly and collusion against the system” and “membership in the illegal group Human Rights Activists in Iran.” A member of the group sentenced, Mr. Yousef Pour Seifi, has been serving his sentence in Ward 350 of Evin Prison since 8 September 2012.143 Mr. Seifi suffers from pre-existing medical conditions including chronic high blood pressure and severe heart arrhythmia (one artery is clogged 60 percent and the other 30 percent.). Mr. Seifi also suffers from retina disorder and is reportedly losing vision in his left eye.

51. Ms. Nasim Ashrafi, a Baha’i citizen, was sentenced on 19 October 2013 to one year in prison on charges of “propaganda against the system” for organizing Baha’ism classes. Ms. Ashrafi is currently serving her one-year prison sentence in the women’s ward of Evin Prison. She has suffered in the past from anaphylactic shock, and there are concerns that she could face the same issue again if not treated properly. Mrs. Ashrafi recently received temporary suspension of her sentence on medical grounds. However, she was re-arrested by security forces allegedly interrupting her treatment. Mrs. Ashrafi’s disease and the lack of medical care while imprisoned have led the Medical Examiner’s Office to issue an opinion stating Mrs. Ashrafi’s imprisonment is physically “intolerable.”

52. Ms. Shamis Mohair, a Baha’i reportedly imprisoned for organizing group prayers, is serving her one-year sentence for “propaganda against the system” in the women’s ward of Evin Prison. When Ms. Mohajer reported to prison, she was undergoing a medical evaluation to determine if she had uterine cancer. The Prison health facility reportedly does not have a gynecologist on staff, and authorities have allegedly refused to transfer Ms. Mohajer to a hospital for medical care. She reportedly also suffers from chronic uterine

142 https://tavaana.org/en/content/bahareh-hedayat-womens-rights-defender
143 https://hra-news.org/fa/thought-and-expression/1-12201
bleeding, fatigue, and weight loss. It was recently reported that authorities agreed to a transfer her to a hospital for a surgical biopsy, but no date for such transfer has been set.

53. Ms. Motahareh Bahrami, the wife of Mr. Daneshpour Moghadam, was arrested on 27 December 2009 and sentenced to 15 years in prison for allegedly supporting the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization. Mrs. Bahrami is serving her sentence in the women’s ward of Evin Prison and suffers from advanced rheumatoid arthritis, which has reportedly contributed to severe difficulty with mobility. 144

54. Mr. Amanollah Mostaghim is serving a five-year sentence at Rajae’i Shahr Prison for collaborating with the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education. 145 He was allowed medical furlough to address issues related to his heart disease but was reportedly returned to prison in August 2014. His physician objected and reportedly stated that Mr. Mostaghim was physically unable to endure his sentence.

55. Mr. Latif Hassani, an Azerbaijani minority political activist and Secretary of the Yeni Gamoh Party, was reportedly arrested on 22 January 2013 in Karaj (Alborz Province) and transferred to the Tabriz Intelligence Office. On 29 April 2013, Branch 3 of the Revolutionary Court of Tabriz sentenced him, alongside Messrs. Mahmoud Fazli, Ayat Mehrali Beiglou, Shahrav Radmehr, and Behboud Gholizadeh to nine-years imprisonment on charges of establishing an illegal group and “propaganda against the system.” He reportedly suffers from heart disease and is in immediate need of medical attention. Mr. Hassani was transferred from Tabriz Prison (East Azerbaijan Province) to Evin Prison (Tehran Province) and then to Rajae’i Shahr Prison on 26 June 2014, after 52 days of hunger strike. During interrogations at the Tabriz Intelligence Office, Mr. Radmehr reportedly fell unconscious due to psychological pressure and was hospitalized for three days. In 2011, he reportedly suffered a heart attack, allegedly due to torture and physical pressure experienced while in detention in 2010. His long-term hunger strike has reportedly weakened his physical condition. Officials at both Tabriz Prison and Rajae’i Shahr Prison (Alborz Province) allegedly prevented his medical furlough.

56. Azeri political activist, Mr. Shahram Radmehr held in Tabriz Prison (East Azerbaijan Province), was recently granted medical furlough. However, he is reportedly being prevented from leaving the prison. Mr. Radmehr reportedly suffers from medical issues including arthritis, severe headaches, and stomach ulcers. In August 2014, Mr. Radmehr was transferred from Tabriz Prison to Meshkin Shahr Prison (Ardebil Province). Before his transfer, the Tabriz Medical Examiner’s Office reportedly confirmed that he was in urgent need of medical treatment and should be provided medical furlough. Prison officials, allegedly opposed Mr. Radmehr’s medical furlough and instead transferred him to Meshkin Shahr Prison. After two months, and despite his family’s persistent pursuit of furlough in accordance with procedure, judicial officials of Meshkin Shahr Prison have not facilitated adequate access to medical care.

57. Mr. Mohsen Daneshpour Moghadam was arrested on 27 December 2009 and sentenced to execution for allegedly supporting the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization. Mr. Moghadam, currently serving his sentence in Ward 350 of Evin Prison, suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. He reportedly also suffers from atherosclerosis, which has apparently also contributed to the deterioration of his condition.

58. Mr. Rasoul Mazraeh, from Ahwaz, is currently suffering from prostate cancer and kidney pain. Prison officials have allegedly refused to grant his transfer to a hospital for treatment. Mr. Mazraeh was allegedly arrested in Syria. He was sentenced to 15 years at

144 http://hra-news.org/fa/prisoners/1-14804
Yasouj Prison (Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province) by Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court of Ahwaz for acting against national security.

59. Mr. Jaber Sakhiravi, reportedly imprisoned at the Karoun Prison in the Khuzestan Province, is suffering from a brain tumor and needs surgery immediately, as his health condition is deteriorating. Mr. Sakhiravi’s eyesight and physical health have reportedly suffered from alleged torture he has endured while in prison.

60. Mr. Golam Abbas Saki, imprisoned at Dezful Prison (Khuzestan Province), is reportedly suffering from prostate cancer and kidney problems. He has allegedly been deprived of adequate medical care. Mr. Saki is also reportedly suffering from both high blood pressure and cholesterol. Mr. Saki was reportedly arrested in Syria and transferred to Iran in 2006. He spent 4.5 years in solitary confinement under the custody of the Intelligence services, and three months at Evin Prison. Branch 4 of the Revolutionary Court of Ahwaz then reportedly sentenced him to five years in prison for acting against national security. The Revolutionary Court of Ahwaz, however, reportedly did not consider the time he had already spent at the Intelligence Center to be time served for his current sentence. He is still incarcerated in Dezful Prison.

61. In its reply to the Draft Report, the Government stated “prisoners have acceptable levels to access to medical care both inside and outside of the prison.” It also claimed that supervisory boards, established by the Judiciary, visit the prisons regularly to ensure compliance.

62. The Special Rapporteur warmly welcomes the Government’s announcement, in its reply to the Draft Report, that “the Islamic Republic of Iran is currently considering accession to [the] UN Convention Against Torture.”

F. Freedom of expression and access to information

i. Newly arrested, imprisoned or prosecuted journalists, netizens and bloggers

cases reported since May 2014

63. Journalists arrested or prosecuted are often accused of contact with foreign media and are seemingly targeted due to their criticism of Government leaders or for discussing sensitive policy issues. This appears to be the result of an overly broad application of national security provisions and stipulations of the 1986 Press Law (which define 17 instances of impermissible content.) For example, impermissible content is defined as, inter alia, that which causes damage to “the foundation of the Islamic Republic”; insults “Islam and its sanctuaries” or “the Leader of the Revolution and recognized religious authorities”; or creates “discord between and among social walks of life specifically by raising ethnic and racial issues.” Moreover, because the majority of cases against journalists are considered involving “national security”, they are tried in Revolutionary Courts. Thus, negating Press Law which stipulates journalists be tried by the Press Court in the presence of a jury. In its reply, the Government noted that the Constitution provides for freedom of expression “except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.” It argued that imprisoned members of the media have committed “serious” offenses, including “satellite networks... insistence on propagating lies and perturbing public peace of mind, and disseminating contents that foment ethnic and religious hatred, extremism and violence.”

64. At least 29 journalists, bloggers, and netizens have reportedly been detained, imprisoned or prosecuted since May 2014. (Mr. Serajeddin Miramadi; Ms. Mahnaz Mohammadi; Mr. Ali Asghar Ghavari; Mr. Jason Rezaian; Mr. Mohammad Reza Pourjashari; Mr. Ali Ghazali; Ms. Sajede Arabsjorkhi; Ms. Zahra Ka’abi; Mr. Hamid Hekmati, Mr. Ismael Izadi, Mr. Farid Saremi, Mr. Farjad Salehi, Mr. Ali Chinisaz; Mr.
Hamed Taghipour; Mr. Masoud Behnam; Ms. Yeganeh Salehi; Mr. Amar Kalantari; Ms. Yaghma Fashkhami; Mr. Saeed Pourheydar; Ms. Reyhaneh Tabataba’ei; Mr. Arash Honarvar Shoja’ei; Ms. Zahra Khandan; Mr. Mohammed Ghoochani; Ms. Abbas Salimi Namin; and five journalists from ISNA, including Mr. Arya Jafari.)

65. Mr. Serajedin Miramadi, a well-known journalist and relative of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was arrested in May 2014 after returning from working abroad as a journalist following the inauguration of President Rouhani. He was convicted in July 2014 of “propaganda against the system” and “conspiracy against national security” and was reportedly sentenced to six years in prison. His sentence was reduced to three years on appeal.

66. On 4 June 2014, Ms. Mahnaz Mohammad was summoned to begin serving a five-year prison sentence for “propaganda against the system” and “assembly and collusion against the system.” She was accused of working for foreign media during the run-up to and aftermath of the 2009 presidential election.

67. *Washington Post* correspondent Mr. Jason Rezaian, who was arrested and detained on 22 July 2014, apparently did not have access to a lawyer during his six months of detention. Authorities would not initially disclose charges against Mr. Rezaian, and while reports now indicate that he may have been charged with espionage in December 2014 or January 2015, official charges -- if any -- remain unclear.

68. In July 2014, Ms. Sajede Arasbarski, a journalist and the daughter of a prominent political dissident, began serving a one-year sentence at Evin Prison for “propaganda against the system.”

69. In August 2014, netizens Ms. Zahra Ka’abi, Mr. Hamid Hekmati, Mr. Ismael Izadi, Mr. Farid Saremi, Mr. Farjad Salehi, and Mr. Ali Chiniszaz were arrested. In addition, two directors of privately-owned religious television stations Mr. Hamed Taghipour and Mr. Masoud Behnam, were also arrested.

70. Mr. Ali Asghar Ghavari of the *Bahar* publication (which was closed in 2013, granted authority to re-open in 2014, and then closed again in 2015) was apparently summoned in September 2014 to serve the remainder of a prior prison sentence for publishing articles “contrary to Islamic criteria,” “spreading falsehoods,” and publishing articles “against the Constitution,” to which he was convicted by a Press Court. Mr. Ghavari is 73-years-old and apparently in poor health. (Mr. Saeed Pour Aziz of *Bahar* was also originally sentenced along with Mr. Ghavari, to 91 days in prison and an additional two-year suspended sentence).

71. Mr. Barmak Jafari of the Free University News Agency was arrested in September 2014, apparently to begin serving a four-year prison sentence from 2009 for “insulting” Government officials.

72. In October 2014, Mr. Arya Jafari and four other ISNA journalists were arrested for covering protests following the October 2014 acid attacks on several women in Esfahan. The four journalists were released within hours but Mr. Jafari was reportedly detained for a week.

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148 Ibid
149 Ibid
150 [https://cpj.org/2014/10/iran-arrests-journalist-covering-acid-attacks-on-w.php](https://cpj.org/2014/10/iran-arrests-journalist-covering-acid-attacks-on-w.php)
73. On 29 November 2014, Mr. Ali Ghazali, a journalist who had covered potential cases of corruption involving high-ranking officials, was re-arrested, apparently after a businessman related to a story he covered filed a complaint against him.\textsuperscript{151}

74. On 30 November 2014, Ms. Reyhaneh Tabataba’ei was convicted and sentenced to one year in prison and a two-year ban on journalistic and political activities. She was charged with “propaganda against the system” for an interview she reportedly conducted in 2013 with a leader of the Sunni minority in Iran, which authorities claimed was penned with the intent of “dividing the nation along ethnic and religious lines.”

75. On 24 December 2014, Ms. Yaghma Fashkhami, a political reporter for the Rooz\textit{an} publication, was apparently arrested at her home for unknown reasons.\textsuperscript{152}

76. Mr. Arash Honarvar Shoja’ei, a cleric and blogger, was already serving a separate four-year sentence at Evin Prison for “insulting (former Iranian Supreme Leader) Imam Khomeini,” “cooperating with foreign embassies,” espionage, and acting against national security, when he was apparently sentenced to an additional four years in prison and 50 lashes in December 2014. His new charges are not yet clear.\textsuperscript{153}

77. Mr. Saeed Pourheydar, a journalist and rights activist who had fled the country in 2011 following the receipt of a five-year prison sentence for “propaganda against the system,” “insulting the President,” and “questioning Islamic principles,” was reportedly arrested on 4 January 2015 after returning to Iran.\textsuperscript{154}

78. On 19 January 2015, apparently IRGC Intelligence Officers dressed in civilian clothes arrested Ms. Zahra Khandan at her home. She was a former journalist with several reformist publications. The reason for her arrest is not clear.

79. On 26 January 2015, Mr. Mohammed Ghoochani, the editor of the \textit{Mardom Emrooz} publication, was charged with “insulting Islam” for publishing a front-page photograph of actor George Clooney wearing an “I am Charlie Hebdo” lapel pin.

80. In January or February 2015, former journalist and the current head of an Iranian History Society, Mr. Abbas Salimi Namin, was sentenced to six months in prison for “insulting” former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2011, when he publicly criticized what he perceived as presidential corruption. Mr. Salimi was also sentenced to 74 lashes for insulting judicial officials and officials at University of Tehran.\textsuperscript{155}

81. On 20 February 2015, Mr. Masoud Bastani, a journalist who was arrested in connection to the post-2009 election unrest and sentenced for “propaganda against the system,” “assembly and collusion with the intent to disrupt national security,” and “publishing falsehoods,” apparently had a heart attack while in prison. His health remains precarious.\textsuperscript{156}

82. On 23 February 2015, Mr. Ali Maghami, was arrested to begin serving a four-month prison sentence. He had received that sentence, along with a four-month suspended sentence, in January 2014.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{151} http://en.irawire.com/features/6158/

\textsuperscript{152} http://en.rsf.org/iran

\textsuperscript{153} http://cpj.org/2015/01/with-new-round-of-journalist-detentions-prosecutio.php

\textsuperscript{154} ibid


\textsuperscript{156} http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2015/02/masoud-bastani/

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
ii. Recently closed publications

83. In its reply to the Draft Report, the Government claimed that Bahar (which was closed for six months and since re-opened) printed an article, which “seriously hurt feeling of the public.” Following the publication of the article Bahar “voluntarily” closed for a period of six months.

84. Iranian authorities continue to close publications deemed subversive by certain elements the political establishment. On 23 December 2014, the Roozan publication was closed by order of the Tehran Prosecutor; seemingly in relation to an article it had published marking the five-year anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri.\(^\text{158}\)

85. In August 2014, five privately-owned religious stations — Imam Hossein, Abolfazal Abass, Alghaem, Alzahra and Almehdi — were closed after being accused by the Intelligence Ministry of “working illegally for satellite TV stations based in the United States and Great Britain,” “provoking sectarian tension within Islam,” “showing a degrading image of Shi’ism” and “insulting the holy figures of Islam.”

86. On 12 January 2015, reformist weekly publication Setareh Sobh was closed after publishing an open letter by Parliamentarian Ali Motahari, in which he called for the trial of jailed opposition leaders Mr. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mr. Mehdi Karoubi, along with Mousavi’s wife Ms. Zahra Rahnavard. The Tehran Media Court which ordered the closure claimed it that it did so to “prevent the occurrence of crime.”

87. On 17 January 2015, reformist daily Mardom Emrooz was closed, following its front-page publication of an image of actor George Clooney wearing an “I am Charlie Hebdo” lapel pin.

88. On 3 February 2015, a Tehran Culture and Media Court ordered the closure of the online publication HMA (“Supporters of [Former President] Mahmoud Ahmadinejad”). The Court who ordered the closure claimed that it was “to prevent the occurrence of a crime.”

89. Around 27 February 2015, authorities ordered the blocking of the Bahar website (which had previously been closed and re-opened) along with the Jamaran site (an official website of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini).\(^\text{159}\)

iii. Censorship / access to information

90. Authorities continue to censor or ban many forms of cultural and artistic expression. For example, in December 2014, apparently under pressure by the Parliament’s Cultural Commission, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance banned the film “Paternal House” by director Kianioush Ayyari.\(^\text{160}\)

91. In November, the Working Group on Determining Instances of Criminal Content confirmed that the Information and Technology Ministry would continue to filter access to some data on Instagram.\(^\text{161}\) In December, FarsNews reported that “immoral” pages on Instagram had been blocked.\(^\text{162}\) In January 2015 it reported that authorities were attempting

\(^{158}\) Ibid

\(^{159}\) Ibid.

\(^{160}\) http://www.entekehab.ir/fa/news/183188

\(^{161}\) http://isna.ir/fa/news/93082010296

\(^{162}\) http://www.radiofarda.com/content/f2-iran-instagram-immoral-pages-filtered-censorship-culture-ministry/26760241.html
to block access to Whatsapp and Tango, in addition to sites similar to Facebook, which are already blocked.163

92. On 26 January 2015, a Contents Working Group was established by the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Culture, in order to, _inter alia_, monitor SMS messages.164

93. In February 2015, various outlets reported that references to former President Mohammad Khatami were banned.

G. Freedom of peaceful assembly and association

i. Non-Governmental Organization Bill

94. A draft Non-Governmental Organizations Bill presented by the Interior Ministry to the Parliament on 9 November 2014165 appears to further threaten the independence of civil society. The Bill envisions councils at the national, provincial, and city levels that will, in part, be responsible for the issuance of activity licenses to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pursuing “social, cultural, artistic, health, environmental, cultural heritage, human rights, ethnic, and development” issues, and whose activities are not currently subject to other laws that govern professional organizations or political entities, such as political parties.166 According to the Bill, Councils would also be responsible for the supervision and support of NGOs and for addressing potential misconduct. NGOs would only be able to officially pursue organizational activities upon receiving establishment permits, activity licenses, and registrations.167 Procedures introduced by the Bill to establish an association appear particularly burdensome and would subject NGOs to administrative supervision which could then be used as a means to quell dissenting views or beliefs, in violation of international norms and standards.

ii. Relevant provisions of the Bill

95. _Councils_: The National Council would consist of 32 officials, including 16 government officials and 16 elected representatives from NGOs.168 Provincial and City Councils will be headed by Governors, City Governors, four NGO representatives, and at least five government officials. Councils will be supported by secretariats responsible for reviewing applications to establish NGOs, for pursuing the implementation of programs and policies that facilitate research activities adopted by the National Council, for cooperating with other executive and supervisory agencies to monitor NGOs, and to review and present reports of misconduct to the National Council.169

96. _The process of obtaining activity licenses:_ NGO’s would be required to submit meeting minutes on the establishment of their organization, including an organogram, organization objectives, a list of activities, expansion plans and procedures, and procedures for the selection of representatives and their duties.170 Authorities, whose representatives

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164 dolat.ir/site/fullstory/news/?serv=12&id=257927
166 Articles 2 and 4.
167 Article 21
168 Article 2 and 9
169 Article 11
170 Article 24
will also have the right to participate in organizational meetings as observers, must approve these documents. The Bill requires that the Intelligence Ministry, police, and other specialized agencies be consulted on the legality of the objectives and activities proposed by the NGO. Government agencies must act within a week of receiving establishment requests for permits.

97. Restrictions on NGO activities: Under the draft, assemblies, publications, online activities, and educational materials would require permits. Annual performance and financial reports must also be submitted to authorities that issue activity licenses. NGOs are required to provide onsite access to their information and documents in the presence of an NGO representative. Removing documents from NGO possession will require a court order.

98. Restrictions on international cooperation: All cooperation and membership with international organizations, such as signing agreements and contracts, would require National Council permission, and the Council must also be notified of organizations’ participation in conferences and training courses outside of the country.

99. Disciplinary mechanism: Compliance would be monitored by either the secretariat or specialized agencies. Disciplinary steps can include a written warning with a deadline to correct breaches of the law, suspension of activity licenses for a maximum of three months, or the dissolution of the organization through the court. If adopted, the law would be retroactive and therefore applicable to all existing NGOs.

100. In its Reply, the Government maintained that “the civil society comprising political parties, trade unions and professional and religious association are freely and extensively active,” adding that “any form of social activity” by “political party, society or association” requires observing laws and regulations and receiving a “permit from Article 10 Commission.”

H. Freedom of religion or belief

i. Dervishes

101. On September 2011, the Ministry of Intelligence arrested seven members of the Gonabadi Dervish community (Sufi Muslims) in the cities of Shiraz and Tehran. On 13 July 2013, the Revolutionary Court sentenced them to prison terms ranging from seven to ten years. On 31 August 2014, they embarked on a hunger strike to protest that their due process rights had been infringed upon. The police interrupted the demonstrations subsequently organized by their families in front of the Office of the Prosecutor in Tehran.
and arrested multiple people.\textsuperscript{181} In late February, reports surfaced that some of these individuals’ sentences may have been reduced or converted to time on probation.\textsuperscript{182}

102. On 27 December 2014, Mr. Hojatolislam Younesi, the President’s Special Assistant on Religious and Ethnic Minorities, admitted in an interview that the treatment of the Dervishes was “arbitrary” and outside the scope of the Islamic Republic’s states policies. He also added that harsh treatment of the community that occurred in the past was contrary to the country’s interest, and that it has not been repeated.

103. On 25 February, plainclothes forces, without a warrant, apparently arrested Mr. Saleh Moradi, a Gonabadi Dervish, possibly to serve a prior sentence.\textsuperscript{183}

\textbf{ii. Baha’is}

104. Despite statements from high-ranking officials that Baha’is are entitled to citizenship rights, they continue to face discrimination, arrest, and arbitrary detention in connection with their religion. Between September and December 2014, security forces in the cities of Esfahan, Tehran, Shiraz, Hamedan, Karaj, and Semnan reportedly arrested at least 20 Baha’is. In February 2015, it was reported that four of these 20 individuals had been summoned to serve sentences (including Ms. Fariba Ashtari),\textsuperscript{184} bringing the total number of imprisoned Baha’is to over 100.

105. Discriminatory restrictions increased with regard to the burial of Baha’is in cemeteries across the country. Authorities in the city of Semnan have reportedly discouraged families from inscribing epitaphs on tombstones, allowing inscriptions to only include first and last names, and dates of birth and death. Authorities have also restricted the construction of additional buildings to accommodate burials in the Baha’i cemetery there. In at least three cases, Iranian authorities have also delayed the burial of Baha’is in the cities of Tabriz and Ahvaz.\textsuperscript{185}

106. Baha’i students also faced discrimination in the 2014-2015 national entrance exam for institutions of higher education. Mr. Shadan Shirazi, a Baha’i student who took the national mathematics exam and placed 113\textsuperscript{th} out of an estimated million students, was reportedly barred from registering at the public university. The Special Rapporteur welcomes statements by officials inviting Baha’i students to submit complaints of violations of their rights to the High Council for Human Rights.\textsuperscript{186}

107. Incitement against Baha’is also continued this past year. On 15 December 2014, Ayatollah Bojnourdi, a high-ranking cleric and a former member of Supreme Judicial Council, stated that “we never say that Baha’is have the right to education; Baha’is don’t even have citizenship rights.”\textsuperscript{187} After negative reactions, he later clarified that only Baha’is “who cooperate with Israel” or “advocate against Islam” are not entitled to citizenship rights, and that they still have human rights even though they cannot take advantage of “privileges,” such as going to university in Iran.\textsuperscript{188}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{181} http://www.kaleme.com/1393/06/29/klm-198183/?theme=fast
  \item \textsuperscript{182} http://www.majzooban.org/en/sufi-news/6585-half-of-the-sentences-of-jailed-gonabadi-dervishes-on-probation.html
  \item \textsuperscript{183} http://www.majzooban.org/en/sufi-news/6589-saleh-moradi,-a-gonabadi-dervish-of-shiraz,-arrested.html
  \item \textsuperscript{184} https://hra-news.org/en/fariba-ashtari-begins-2-year-sentence-yazd-prison
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Information submitted to the Special Rapporteur by the Baha’i Community in December 2014
  \item \textsuperscript{186} http://www.ilna.ir/news/news.cfm?id=157330
  \item \textsuperscript{187} http://www.ilna.ir/news/news.cfm?id=157330
  \item \textsuperscript{188} http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/592485
\end{itemize}
108. In 2011, Mr. Behnam Roghani, a shop-owner in Esfahan’s bazaar, converted to the Bahai faith and began distributing DVDs and pamphlets about his faith. He reportedly received threatening mail from unknown individuals, which lead to his decision to leave the country on 26 June 2012. In 2013, he produced a documentary about violations of the rights of Baha’is in Iran. He has also worked on various campaigns to address the persecution of the Baha’is in Iran. In July 2014, Mr. Roghani claims he received a copy of a threatening religious Fatwa from Iran, declaring him Mahdor- Al-Dam (meaning he is not entitled to Diyah “blood money” in case he is the victim of a violent crime). 189

109. In September 2014, an appeals court apparently confirmed the one-year sentence of Mr. Adnan Rahmat Panah, a Baha’i citizen from Shiraz. Mr. Rahmat Panah, who was originally arrested in December 2012 and held for 186 days at an Intelligence Detention Center in Shiraz, was summoned to begin serving that sentence on 6 November 2015. Credible sources have indicated that evidence used to convict Mr. Rahmat Panah of “propaganda against the system” included pictures on Facebook in which he had been “tagged” by others, as well as emails he allegedly sent — without receiving replies — to foreign news media organizations.

iii. Christians

110. In December 2014, authorities allegedly arrested four individuals (Ms. Sara Rahiminejad, Mr. Majid Sheidae, Mr. Mostafa Nadri, and Mr. George Issaian) at a Christmas Eve celebration in Fardis village in Karaj. The four individuals were converts from Islam. Plainclothes officers allegedly searched their belongings, beat and insulted them and then arrested them. Five Additional Christian converts (Mr. Ahmad Bazyar, Ms. Faegheh Nasrollahi, Ms. Mastaneh Rastegari, Mr. Amir Hossein Nematollahi, and a man identified as “Mr. Hosseini”) were also arrested at a house church in eastern Tehran on Christmas Day. Some reports indicate that many more individuals were arrested and quickly released. 190

111. Branch 1 of the Karaj Revolutionary Court apparently sentenced Mr. Hossein (“Stephan”) Saketi Aramsari, another Christian convert, to prison. He has been imprisoned since the summer of 2013.

112. Christian leaders (including Pastor Farshid Fathi) continue to serve prison time apparently solely for exercising their internationally protected rights to freedom of belief, association, and expression.

iv. Erfan Halgheh

113. On 6 February 2015, Fars News Agency reported that 16 instructors from the Erfan Halgheh (“Inter-Universalism”) spiritual movement were sentenced to a total of 37 years in prison and fined 130 million toman, on charges including blasphemy and obtaining illicit wealth. 191 (See “Reprisals” section for information on Mr. Mohammad Ali Taheri).

v. Sunni Muslims

(See section on prison conditions and access to medical care for case details on various Sunni [including ethnic Kurdish and ethnic Arab] individuals).

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189 Interview Submitted to the Office of the Special Rapporteur, 19 December 2015.
VI. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

A. Economic Rights

i. Right to Organize and Collectively Bargain

114. In August 2014, hundreds of workers from the Bafgh Iron Ore Mine protested the arrest of nine of their colleagues, following strikes, which had begun in May 2014 over a Government plan to privatize the mines.192

In December 2014, at least three members of the Coordinating Committee to help form Workers’ Organizations in Iran were arrested.

115. Other trade unionists and labor rights leaders imprisoned in Iran for protected activities include: Messrs. Reza Shahabi; Sharokh Zamani; Yousef Ab-Kharabat; Vahed Seyedei; Afshin Nadimi; Mahmood Bagheri; Abdolreza Ghabari; and Rasoul Bodaghi. The following four trade unionists and labor rights activists have been convicted for exercising protected rights but are awaiting the outcomes of appeals: Messrs. Khaled Hossein; Ali-Akbar Baghani; Mahmood Beheshiti-Langaroudi; and Alireza Hashemi. Finally, at least six labor rights leaders have been sentenced to prison terms for protected activities and are at immediate risk of arrest to serve those terms: Messrs. Hassan Rassoulnejad; Jamal Minashiri; Hadi Tanoumand; Ghassem Mostafapour; Ebrahim Mostafapour; and Mr. Mohammad Karimi.193

116. In its reply to the Draft Report, the Government of Iran claims that no labor leaders have been arrested for their defense of labor rights, and that the country’s failure to accede to the two ILO conventions dealing with freedom of association has no negative impact on policy.

ii. Labor actions permitted by authorities

117. Some labor groups have been permitted to advocate for their rights, including through ongoing actions by hundreds of workers at places like the Stephan Cement Company in Dizicheh, Esfahan Province, and by Yaz Khorramshahr Industry workers.

118. In August 2014, the head of administrative affairs at the security office of the Iran-Shahr Steam Power Plant claimed that the plant discriminated against members of the Balouch minority group. According to Mr. Mohammad Anvar Amiri, less than 40 of 400 employees there of the Balouch minority group, and more than 85% of plant supervisors were non-Balouch.194 Balouch people largely inhabit the region the plant is in.

119. In December 2014, around 700 nurses protested outside of the President’s residence in Tehran against massive disparities in pay between doctors and nurses, the Government’s failure to define nurse’s pay in accordance with the law, and to draw awareness to the dwindling number of nurses in the country.195

120. Also in December, around 900 workers from the Pars Wagon Factory went on strike to protest the dismissal by authorities of their workers’ representative.196

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192 http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/08/bafgh-workers-strike/
195 http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2014/12/141214_nm_protest_nurse_hospital
iii. Public statements

121. In November 2014, the Secretary of the Mandazarin Province’s Labor Council, Mr. Nabid Rasouli, criticized what he viewed as the Central Bank’s and the Government’s inadequate response to rising inflation rates. Mr. Rasouli stated “Unfortunately, there is a great gap between the Central Bank’s inflation rate and the minimum necessities for securing the livelihood of workers’ families… The situation has put the most pressure on the workers’ community; while the administration and parliament, as officials responsible for the current state of the economy, are debating political and elections discussions, the workers are getting poorer day by day for not being able to secure their livelihoods.”197

122. In November 2014, MP Nader Ghazipour suggested that in order to keep pace with inflation, the minimum wage should be at least 2.5 million toman.198

123. In August 2014, the head of the workers’ faction in Iran’s Parliament claimed the 90% of workers in Iran were living below the poverty line, and that many others weren’t far from it.199 According to Iran’s Labor Minister, in a recent effort to make insurance more widely available they have provided of insurance booklets to 4.8 million people.200

iv. Workplace safety

124. According to the National Medical Examiner’s Office, there were 657 work-related deaths in the first four months of the current Iranian calendar year. This is an increase from 632 recorded over the same period last year. Falls from heights, injuries from blunt objects, and electrocution remained the top three causes of workplace deaths. During the same period, the Medical Examiner’s office received reports of 10,109 cases of workplace accidents.201 In August, an unnamed official suggested that the Social Security Organization insured only 10% of workers killed during the previous year.202

125. According to Tehran’s Medical Examiner, there were 297 annual work-related deaths in the province by 1 November 2014. This is an increase from the previous year (the same time period was 282).203

126. In October 2014, Iran’s Minister of Labor suggested that the incidence of on-site accidents in small workshops (housing 50 or less workers) could be reduced by employing in-house inspectors, rather than solely relying upon periodic and possibly infrequent inspections.204

127. On 7 December 2014, Iran’s Parliament passed an amendment to Article 5 of the Social Insurance of Construction Workers Law. The amendment (an addition of new fees on employers and employees) was apparently intended to facilitate the extension of insurance to the uninsured.205

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201 http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/499224
204 Ibid
B. The plan to protect hijab and modesty and gender segregation in the workplace

(See Report for details of Bill).

C. Right to Health

i. Satellite jamming and its health impacts

128. Iranian authorities reportedly continue to prosecute individuals for the possession and use of satellite dishes. In September 2014, police reportedly attempted to enter the home of 65-year-old Tehran resident Mr. Mohammad Ali Khouei. Mr. Kouei requested the police to produce a warrant and produce proper identification. The police apparently failed to produce identification and proceeded to search the rooftop for satellite dishes. Due to the stressful nature of the event, Mr. Khouei, a war veteran, apparently suffered a fatal heart attack, which was witnessed by neighbors.206

129. In February 2014, Minister of Health, Dr. Seyyed Hassan Ghazizadeh, announced the formation of a special committee. The committee consists of representatives from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Information and Technology, and Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization with the purpose to investigate the potential health effects of satellite jamming.207 The committee has yet to announce its findings. In October, Mr. Saeed Motassadi of the Department of the Environment also noted that “the topic of jamming causing cancer [has been] studied many times, and the possibility exists of this illness coming about in individuals as a result from the effects of jamming.”208

ii. LGBT (supplemental to the “Transgender Iranians” section of the Report)

130. In its reply to the Draft Report, the Government noted its support for the transgender community, and suggested that it was formulating policies to provide for increased health and financial assistance to members of that community. The Government stated its total rejection of “homosexual behaviors.”

131. Mr. Ahmad Farzanpour was detained twice in Tehran; once in 2006 by authorities for confronting officials in a local mosque about the volume of the call-to-prayer, which he felt was contributing to his mother’s seizures, and once in 201, after he returned to Iran from abroad, in connection with alleged participation in political protests while outside of the country. In 2006, Mr. Farzanpour was beaten while in detention in part because authorities had found videos on his mobile phone indicating that he is a member of the LGBT community. While detained in 2011, Mr. Farzanpour was held incommunicado without access to a lawyer or contact with family and was reportedly psychically and psychologically abused. He was released informally and fled the country. He continues to suffer from medical conditions reportedly related to beatings while in detention.

D. Land mines

132. In October 2013 the City Governor of Marivan, in the Kurdistan province, reported that seven children from the Neshkash village in Marivan were injured due to a land mine

"http://persian.iranhumanrights.org/1393/07/khoiee_mahvareh/"
"http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/02/satellite-jamming/
explosion. The children were reportedly unfamiliar with the risks of land mines and were playing with the object at an abandoned military base. As a result of the explosion, Garshin, an 11-year-old, lost her right leg; Ala, a six-year-old, suffered an eye injury; Behnoush, a nine-year-old, suffered injury to both hands, feet, and abdomen; Sima, a five-year-old, suffered injury to the face, body, and feet; Zana, a 13-year-old suffered injury to the ear, head, and body; Khebat’s right eye was injured; and Matin, an eight-year old boy, was also injured.

133. A year after the incident, in October 2014, a lawyer representing the children reported their ongoing need for adequate medical care. The lawyer stated “The girl [Garshin] who lost her leg in this incident does not have the means to purchase a prosthesis from the Red Crescent. Some of these families don’t even have the money to pay for a taxi service to visit the hospital or lawyer, or to even pursue the legal process after this incident […] They don’t have money for the surgery to have the land mine fragments removed from their frail bodies.” He maintained that the land mines surround abandoned military bases and that sometimes heavy rains cause the movement of mines into municipal settlements, children’s playgrounds, and agricultural lands, and therefore continue to pose a “serious threat to the health and security of citizens in these areas.”

134. A few days later, the Kurdistan Governor, in a meeting with the child land mine victims of Neshkash, reportedly apologized and noted that the Government had agreed to pay all treatment costs for the children. The Governor reiterated that the clearing of Kurdistan’s border areas of land mines remained a priority for the administration. He admitted that the clearing of contaminated areas was not 100% achieved, and highlighted the relevant difficulties by noting that there are still places in the world, which were cleaned after World War I but still experience explosions.

135. In its Reply, the Government points out that the land mines in the five western provinces of the country were planted by the former regime of Iraq during Iran-Iraq war and it holds Iraq and “those countries that supported her in imposing war on Iran” responsible for them. The Government also points out that the former ICRC chief in Tehran, the UN Resident Coordinator, a UNDP representative in Iran, and the Director General of Genève International Center for De-mining praised the post-war demining of contaminated areas. Moreover, despite apparent Government requests for assistance for its Iran Mine Action Center, the international community has not provided any aid.

VII. Gender equality and women’s rights

A. The plan to promote virtue and prevent vice

136. On 3 January 2015, the Guardian Council ruled the plan which would have encouraged vigilante justice by individuals and members of the basij and IRGC based on their interpretations of religious law, unconstitutional.

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209 http://old.etemadnewspaper.ir/Released/92-07-28/97.htm#255499
211 http://www.ana.ir/Home/Single/109068
212 Ibid
213 http://www.shabestan.ir/detail/News/408631
B. Violence against women

i. Acid attacks

137. On 16 October 2014, the Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA) published a report on at least four incidents\(^\text{214}\) of acid attacks where women who were driving in the city of Esfahan were severely injured by acid thrown on them by unknown individuals. Rumors immediately spread on social media that the individuals might have been targeted on the basis of their clothing, and that the number of victims was higher than four. Farihkhtegan Newspaper reported on the attack of Ms. Soheila Jorkesh on 20 October 2014. The article stated that “families of the Esfahan victims have claimed that before throwing acid on the victims, the perpetrators exclaimed: ‘We confront women with poor hijab.’”\(^\text{215}\)

138. On 20 October 2014, Iran’s police chief, Mr. Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam, acknowledged, “around seven to eight people had been targeted in Esfahan.” He also said a number of suspects had been detained but that the motives behind the attacks were still unknown.\(^\text{216}\)

139. On 20 October 2014, the Judiciary’s Spokesperson, Mr. Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, rejected any connection between the acid attacks and Islamic hijab stating “[c]ontrary to allegations made by certain websites, such claims have not yet been confirmed.”\(^\text{217}\) He added that the cases would be processed under rules for expedited judicial procedure. On 22 October 2014, the Security Deputy of the Interior Ministry denied allegations that the attacks were planned and/or conducted by a group stating “we are confident the attacks were carried out by one individual.”\(^\text{218}\) Iranian officials strongly reject speculation that the women might have been targeted for what was perceived as improper clothing according to Islamic principles. On 23 October 2014 the Head of the Office of the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Police, Mr. Adbolah Mahmoudzadeh, announced that individuals accused of conducting acid attacks had been arrested by the police and that the incident was not related to improper clothing.\(^\text{219}\)

140. On 13 November 2014, Mr. Ismaeli Moghadam, the Chief-of-Police, admitted that the perpetrator had not yet been arrested. He also announced that 380 acid attacks had been committed against both individuals and private property over the past year.\(^\text{220}\)

141. Following the Esfahan attacks, the administration announced its intent to work with the Judiciary to intensify punishment for such attacks. Authorities, however, prohibited protests against the attacks and in support of investigations. Although, on 24 October 2014, MP Abed Fatahi from Urumiah defended the rights of protestors. Civil society actors, including Ms. Nasrin Sotoudeh, Mr. Peyman Aref and Ms. Giti Pourfazel, who participated in a demonstration to protest the attacks in front of the Interior Ministry in Tehran, were arrested.

142. In response to the present report, the Government notes that Iranian authorities consistently and strongly condemn these grave actions. The government admits that the perpetrators have not yet been arrested.

\(^{214}\) http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/93072614051
\(^{215}\) http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/10/sotoudeh-on-acid-attacks/
\(^{216}\) http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/443897
\(^{217}\) http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/93072815861
\(^{219}\) http://www.isna.ir/fa/News/81360499/
143. In its response to concerns raised by the Special Rapporteur in his 2014 Report to the General Assembly about the prevalence of violence against women in the country, and on shortcomings in national laws and institutional frameworks for addressing the problem, the Iranian Government maintained that domestic violence was a capital offence and noted that legislation to legally define all forms of domestic violence was being considered. The Vice President for Women and Family Affairs announced on 29 November 2014 that the draft legislation to “Protect Women Against Violence” has been submitted to the Administration’s Bills’ Commission, and said that her office had recommended that the Judiciary establish safe houses for abused women.

ii. Freedom of assembly for protestors of acid attacks

144. On 22 October, over 2,000 protestors gathered in front of the Esfahran Justice Department calling on authorities to investigate the attacks. On the same day in Tehran, dozens of people demonstrated in solidarity with the victims in Esfahran, staging a gathering in front of the Iranian parliament and calling for investigations of the attacks and the provision of security for women in society.221

145. In the days following the demonstrations of 22 October, the Governor of Esfahran stated “any assembly on the matter is illegal,”222 and the Chief of Police of Iran suggested “all [protestors] have a common source, and they want to influence society [and] spread a climate of insecurity; fortunately none of their calls have been widely welcomed.”223 He also claimed that individuals and media advocating such demonstrations aim to “disseminate terror” in Iranian society.224

146. On 24 October 2014, Parliamentarians Mr. Abed Fatahi, an Urmiah (the only Members of Parliament to visit the protestors) disagreed with negative views towards protests stating, “women have the right to protest. Even if they sit in all the city squares as a sign of protest, they still have the right because the peace and comfort of women in our society has been negated; this is not a good thing. I’m sorry that some of the Members of Parliament are still trying to reduce the tragic story of acid attacks to [a story of] ‘love revenge.’ In my mind, there was something else behind the acid attacks, which I hope is not proven by the police investigation.”225

147. On 25 October 2014, several society activists (Ms. Nasrin Sotoudeh, Mr. Peyman Aref and Ms. Giti Pourfazel) who had participated in a demonstration in protest of the attacks in front of the Interior Ministry of Tehran were arrested for a few hours.226

C. Women’s rights activists

148. A British-Iranian woman, Ms. Ghoncheh Ghavami, was arrested along with ten other women who attempted to enter Azadi Stadium for a volleyball match between Iran and Italy’s national teams on 20 June 2014, with intention to protest laws that prohibit women from sports arenas. Ms. Ghavami was arrested again on 30 June, allegedly due to content on her mobile phone, including text messages and photos. She was charged with “propaganda against the system,” and tried before Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court on

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221 http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/443827
222 http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2014/10/141028_l03_acid_attacks_isfahan
226 Rezan Khandan’s Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/reza.khandan.5/posts/86881346462339
14 October 2014. She was detained in solitary confinement for 41 days and transferred to Gharchak Varamin Prison on 5 November 2014. On 2 November 2014, Ms. Ghavami’s lawyer announced that he had been shown court documents stating that Ms. Ghavami was found guilty and had been sentenced to one year in prison. Ms Ghavami was released on bail on 23 November 2014.

149. Ms. Mahdieh Golroo, a student and women rights activist who had previously served 30 months in prison on charges of “assembly and collusion with the intent to disrupt national security” and “propaganda against the system” following the 2009 protest, was arrested by the IRGC on 26 October 2014, and transferred to Ward 2A of Evin Prison. Ms. Golroo was detained for a total of months. She was not informed of the charges against her nor allowed access to legal counsel. Ms.Golroo was released on 27 January on bail and expected to return on her trial date.

150. Ms. Akram Neghabi (the mother of Mr. Saeed Zeynali, who has been missing since his arrest in 1999 by security forces,) has been arrested on several occasions for pursuing and speaking out against the disappearance of her son. Ms. Neghabi has been detained and put in solitary confinement for 63 days. She is currently not detained yet; she still faces the risk of arrest and prosecution. Ms. Neghabi’s son, Mr. Zeynali, is a 23-year-old student, who was arrested at his home in 1999 by plainclothes security forces. Mr. Zeynali was not involved in any serious political activity, except for protests to push then-President Khatami to follow up on campaign promises and to put an end to the “chain” serial killings. After months of searching, family members learned that Mr. Zeynali had been arrested by Revolutionary Guards and taken to an unknown location. Since then he has been missing, with no information about his whereabouts and/or fate forthcoming.

151. Ms. Atena Farghdani, an artist and child rights activist was arrested in August 2014 and detained for 2.5 months in Ward 2A of Evin Prison. On 10 January 2015 she was transferred to Gharchak prison after being sentenced by Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court on charges of “propaganda against the system,” “assembly and collusion against the system,” “insulting” Members of Parliament, and “insulting members” of the IRGC and three branches of Government during her interrogation. The guards at the Revolutionary Court allegedly beat Ms. Farghdani when she requested to visit her mother before being transferred to prison.227 After her release from Ward 21, Miss Farghdani wrote in an open letter to the President’s and the Supreme Leader’s offices informing them that women’s restrooms in Ward 2A of Evin prison are allegedly being monitored by security cameras. Ms. Farghdani emphasized that she had previously filed a complaint about the security cameras and mistreatment by prison authorities, but that neither were investigated. Ms. Farghdani began a hunger strike protesting Gharchak prison conditions on 9 February 2015. She is reportedly in very poor health as a result of her hunger strike, and has possibly been transferred to a hospital. On 2 March 2015 it was reported that authorities might have agreed to transfer her to Evin Prison on the condition that she end her hunger strike.

152. On 2 March 2015, Ms. Negar Haeri was released on bail from Gharchak Prison. She had apparently been detained without charges against her in July 2014. Ms. Haeri, a lawyer, appears to have been targeted by authorities on multiple occasions due to family members’ affiliation with the MKO organization.228

153. Ms. Nazafarin Sabouri, advocates for her brother Mr. Alireza Sabouri, who was shot near a basij station while attending the “silent march” on 15 June 2009, following the 2009 presidential election. According to Ms. Sabouri, one of the bullets fired from the station

227 http://persian.iranthumanrights.org/1393/10/atenah-farghdani/
ricochoeted and passed through his forehead. Protestors reportedly helped Mr. Sabouri to a hospital, where he was in a coma for about a month during which time his family was searching for him. Mr. Sabouri’s medical record allegedly states that Mr. Sabouri endured blunt force trauma from a baton used to strike him at least three dozen times. Mr. Sabouri reportedly suffered loss of speech, urinary incontinence, and required a feeding-tube upon regaining consciousness. He was discharged from the hospital approximately a month after the incident, and reportedly suffered from amnesia and numbness in his hands and feet, and required additional surgery to remove four remaining bullet fragments from his head. He has since left the country for Turkey and ultimately the United States, but prior to his departure Mr. Sabouri reportedly underwent eight months of speech and physiotherapy at home. He passed away on 17 November 2011 in the United States.