

UN WATCH

**A Brief Arguing in Favor of Israel's
Admission into the Western
European and Others Group**

January 1996

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In order to facilitate the UN's work, its member states are divided into five regional groups.

Israel is the only member state of the UN which is excluded from joining a regional group.

This exclusion has severely disadvantaged Israel in a number of ways: its candidates cannot be elected to many UN bodies, its right to vote in a number of UN bodies has been curtailed and its right to participate in much UN decision making has been severely abridged.

This exclusion violates crucial charter principles:

- 1. The right of states to be treated in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality.**
- 2. The right to vote and participate equally in the decision making process at the General Assembly.**
- 3. The right to participate equally in General Assembly discussions.**

Ideally, Israel should be admitted to the Asian group, the group to which Israel belongs on the basis of geographical location. There is no possibility that this will occur in the near future. In the meantime, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) is the regional group to which Israel is best suited. WEOG has the opportunity and the UN bears a responsibility to ensure that Israel's unjust exclusion from the regional groups is redressed.

1. IMPORTANCE OF GROUP SYSTEM¹

Since the mid-1960's the member states of the UN have been divided into five regional groups: the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), the African, the Asian, the Latin American and the Eastern European groups (the "Group System").²

Organized on a voluntary basis, the Group System is not provided for in the UN Charter. As the number of UN members has grown, however, the UN has increasingly relied on the Group System to facilitate the UN's work.³ The Group System is now integral to the way in which the UN manages its member states' work at the UN.

Indeed, two of the most important UN organs, the General Assembly (GA) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), have passed numerous resolutions granting the Group System a central role in UN elections.⁴ These resolutions stipulate that representation at the UN is to be based on a predetermined ratio between the five regional groups⁵ (see Appendices A7-A12).

Thus, the regional groups divide the elected positions of GA and ECOSOC among themselves, selecting slates of candidates in advance of formal GA and ECOSOC elections.⁶ Usually, formal elections merely rubber-stamp decisions already made by states selecting candidates from within their respective regional groups.⁷

The Group System is also used to select candidates for the Security Council (SC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as well as a number of other important UN bodies and agencies (see **figure 1**). Further, the bureaux (consisting of the officers) of UN conferences are generally comprised of a candidate from each regional group.

The Group System also serves as the primary venue for many substantive negotiations, as well as an important channel for consultation on many procedural

¹ UN Watch would like to thank Avner M. Shapiro, Esq. for his substantial contribution to the preparation of this brief.

² Sydney Bailey, United Nations: A Concise Political Guide (1994) 44 - 137.

³ M. Petterson, The General Assembly in World Politics (1986) 102, 105.


⁴ GA Resolutions 18/1990 (1963), 18/1991(1963), 33/138 (1978), 26/2847(1971), 28/3108 (1973), 43/222 (1988), 36/39 (1981), 35/16 (1980), 31/192 (1976); ECOSOC Resolutions 1981/50 (1981), 1147/XLI (1966), 1535/XLIX (1970), 1993/207 (1993), 1990/48 (1990), 1989/45 (1989).

⁵ Id.

⁶ Appendix B34; A/SPC/33/SR.48 para. 5, 6; Wolfrum and Philipp at 75; H. G. Nicholas The United Nations as a Political Institution (1975) 130.

⁷ Petterson at 102-104.

FIGURE 1 - RESTRICTIONS ON ISRAEL'S REPRESENTATION AT THE UN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ITS EXCLUSION FROM THE GEOPOLITICAL GROUPS.



matters.⁸ The Latin American Group, for example, holds regular weekly meetings.⁹ At these meetings states engage in a number of activities, including the formulation of common positions on issues of the day, decisions on slates of candidates for various posts in the GA and other UN organs, the formulation of draft proposals, and the coordination of common tactics to ensure the defeat or passage of proposals coming before the GA and other UN bodies.¹⁰

Informal negotiations and discussions within and between the regional groups have in many instances replaced debate in UN bodies.¹¹ In the case of the GA plenary, its procedural practices, such as half-hour time limits on speechmaking and limitations on the right of reply, have encouraged the GA's reliance on prior meetings and deliberations of the regional groups.¹²

2. BLATANT DISCRIMINATION

Although the Group System performs essential functions at the UN, Israel, a UN member state since 1949, has never been admitted to a regional group and is, therefore, the only UN member excluded from the Group System (see [Appendix A1-A2](#)).

Israel's singular exclusion from the group system has harmed it in a number of ways. Most quantifiably, Israel's representation at the UN has suffered because the regional groups promote only the representation of their own members.¹³

As **Figure 1** indicates, Israel cannot be elected *inter alia* to three of the UN's principal organs: the SC, ECOSOC and the ICJ. Israel has also been deprived of representation in all ECOSOC sub-bodies such as the Commission on Human Rights and many other important UN organs, agencies, and committees.¹⁴ Israel has no access to the bureaus established for UN international conferences.

Israelis have been elected to UN bodies only in those rare cases where the elections are *ad personam* and not dependent on the Group System. For the vast majority

⁸ Petterson at 103.

⁹ Bailey at 39, 43.

¹⁰ Petterson at 92.

¹¹ [Appendix B41](#); A/SPC/33/SR.48 para. 78; Petterson at 27-40.

¹² Petterson at 31-39.

¹³ See [United Nations Handbook](#), New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1965-1995).

¹⁴ *Id.*

of elections, particularly in the principal UN organs, the Group System plays a decisive role in their outcome.¹⁵

Exclusion from the Group System has also undermined Israel's ability to participate effectively in UN activities in ways unrelated to the issue of representation.

Israel cannot participate in Group System meetings where important topics are discussed and decisions taken. Israel cannot rely on a regional group to increase its bargaining power when it interacts with states.¹⁶ Finally, unlike other states Israel cannot look toward a regional group as a catalyst for cultivating the loyalty and support of fellow states at the UN.¹⁷

Israel's isolation, resulting from the anomaly of its exclusion from the Group System, has made it easier for Israel's adversaries to generate international hostility toward Israel at the UN. Over the last thirty years, Israel's exclusion has facilitated the passage of hundreds of GA resolutions directed against Israeli interests.¹⁸ For instance, Israel's isolation at the GA arguably made it easier for states hostile to Israel to rally support in favor of the passage of GA Resolution 30/3379 (1975), now repealed, which equated Zionism with Racism.

3. A VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER

Israel's exclusion from the Group System violates fundamental Charter principles.

First, Article 2(1) of the UN Charter proclaims, "The [United Nations] Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." This Article defines "the position of member states with regard to and within the Organization."¹⁹ It enjoins "UN organs [to] . . . treat states equally," and to "maintain equality among their member states."²⁰

¹⁵ Wolfrum at 71.

¹⁶ Petterson at 102; Wolfrum at 75.

¹⁷ Petterson at 45.

¹⁸ Avi Beker, The United Nations and Israel: From Recognition to Reprehension (1988) at 610; Petterson at 27.

¹⁹ Djura Nincic, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations (1970) 36; Leland Goodrich, Edward Hambro, and Anne Patricia Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (1969) 156.

²⁰ Bruno Sima, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (1994) 78, 88.

The right of sovereign equality is the Charter's primary organizational principle. It is overriding in the relations between UN members and the UN itself.²¹ Indeed, the principle of sovereign equality governs the activities of all UN organs, unless otherwise stated in the Charter.²² According to the International Court of Justice, "The equality of rights and obligations [of states] is, unless otherwise expressly provided, a fundamental feature of the Charter."²³

With particular regard to the GA, the Charter permits no deviation from the principle of sovereign equality.²⁴ To the contrary, the Charter affirms the supremacy of this principle at the GA by expressly guaranteeing equal voting rights to all member states regardless of their economic strength, military power, geography, population or politics.²⁵ These provisions manifest an intent by the UN's founders to enshrine the principle of sovereign equality at the GA as a check on strength of the great powers.²⁶

As an integral part of the GA and the UN, the Group System must operate in a manner consistent with the principle of sovereign equality.²⁷ While Articles 23, 33, 52 and 53 of the Charter assume a world organization resting on a number of closer, pre-existing associations of member states, "such arrangements are permissible only to the extent that they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN."²⁸

In affirming the principle of sovereign equality, the Charter endorses the notion that all states should have a substantially equal right to representation at the UN unless it expressly provides otherwise.²⁹ The Charter details procedures for preserving the right of all states to equal representation by mandating a maximum of five representatives per state to the GA and by granting each member state an equal vote in GA elections.³⁰ The GA's own rules of procedure specify that GA elections should promote a "representative character" within UN organs.³¹

²¹ Certain Expenses U.N., ICJ Reports (1962) 197. See also Georg Schwartzenberger, International Law, International Courts III and Tribunals (1976) 206; Bernard Gilson, The Conceptual System of Sovereign Equality (1984) 548.

²² Schwartzenberger at 206.

²³ Aerial Incident, ICJ Reports (1959) 177.

²⁴ Nincic at 123.

²⁵ Article 18, UN Charter; Nincic at 123; Norman Bentwich and Andrew Martin, Commentary on the United Nations Charter (1969) 51.

²⁶ Robert A. Klein, Sovereign Equality Among States: The History of an Idea (1974) 127, 166.

²⁷ Petterson at 105; Bailey at 38.

²⁸ Bentwich at 35; see also Nicholas at 132.

²⁹ Aerial Incident, ICJ Reports (1959) 177.

³⁰ Article 9, UN Charter; Article 18, UN Charter.

³¹ See Rules 31 and 38, GA's Rules of Procedure.

The Group System must operate in a manner that advances the cause of "equitable representation" within the UN. The UN originally mandated the Group System to control GA elections in order to promote equitable representation and uphold the principle of sovereign equality.³² During a 1963 debate, Iran's representative to the GA's Special Political Committee offered the following rationale for instituting such a system:

The decisions of the United Nations [will] be respected and its actions justified only if Member States [are] convinced that the Organization [is], in accordance with the provisions of Article 2(1) of the Charter, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members it [is] difficult to see how fifty-odd Member States could feel that its decisions [are] just if they [are] not adequately represented in its various bodies. . . All [Member States] ha[ve] the obligation to contribute to the maintenance of world peace and security and, by the same token, the right to participate in the work of the bodies entrusted with that task.³³

In the case of Israel, the Group System has failed to function as intended. Indeed, the Group System has, for thirty years, worked to deprive Israel of its right to representation at the UN. In so doing, the Group System has operated in violation of the principle of sovereign equality.

Second, Israel's exclusion from the Group System has denied it the right to vote and participate equally in the decision making process at the GA, a right which is inherent in Article 18 of the Charter.³⁴ All states at the GA must "be placed in a position of equality as regards the taking of decisions, [and they must] all participate to the same extent in the process whereby the decisions are adopted."³⁵

In the GA, the Group System has been the primary forum for the taking of decisions on important substantive and procedural matters.³⁶ Israel has had no chance, let alone an equal chance, to participate in these decisions. In effect, Israel has only been allowed to cast its vote in the GA after the other states have already determined the

³² A/SPC/18/SR. 421 para 15, para 25; A/SPC/18/SR. 425 para. 6, 23; A/SPC/18/SR. 428 para 27, 60; A/SPC/33/SR. 48 para 90; A/SPC/33/SR. 26 para 16.

³³ A/SPC/18/SR.425 para. 26.

³⁴ Article 18(1) of the UN Charter states that "Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote."

³⁵ Nincic at 118; Herbert Weinschel, "The Doctrine of the Equality of States and its Recent Modifications," *AJIL*, Vol. 45, no. 3. (July 1951) 438.

³⁶ Wolfrum at 75.

outcome of votes in their respective regional groups. This unjust interference with the voting rights of a member state is not a political problem; rather, it represents a serious violation of international law.³⁷

Third, pursuant to Article 10 of the Charter, the GA has a wide mandate to discuss a variety of issues.³⁸ When read in the context of the overriding Charter principle of sovereign equality, inherent in this Charter provision is the right of states to an equal opportunity to participate in all GA discussions. Israel has been wrongly and unjustly excluded from regional group meetings where important discussions take place about matters which are later debated in the GA.³⁹ Therefore, the Group System has deprived Israel of its right to participate equally in GA discussions.

The UN has a special responsibility in regard of these Charter violations. Although it did not create the Group System, the UN has become institutionally reliant on it. Therefore, the UN has an obligation to ensure that the Group System operates in conformity with the Charter. It must take action to redress Israel's exclusion from the Group System.

4. ADMISSION TO WEOG IS THE BEST REMEDY

Israel's ultimate aim is to join the Asian group, the group to which it belongs geographically. Israel cannot, however, be admitted to this group in the near future. A state can only join a group if all members agree by consensus, and several members of the Asian group, such as Iran, Libya and Iraq, strongly oppose admitting Israel. Indeed, this is the only group where individual members have actively opposed the admission of a state despite that state fitting geographically -- a case of rank discrimination against a UN member.

³⁷ Mosul Case, Advisory Opinion of PCIJ 1925. The Court held that activities affecting the voting procedures of the League of Nations constituted a legal problem that could not be treated as merely a political problem.

³⁸ Article 10 of the Charter states:

"The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters."

³⁹ Petterson at 27, 40.

Until Israel is admitted into the Asian group, the best way to redress Israel's exclusion from the Group System is for WEOG to admit Israel to its ranks. As an interim solution, this is the regional group to which Israel is best suited for a number of reasons.

First, WEOG has admitted states to its ranks, such as Australia and New Zealand which, like Israel, are not geographically located in Western Europe. In fact, WEOG is composed of states from three different continents (see Appendix A1-A2). Unlike the other regional groups, WEOG is not a true regional grouping.

Second, the common denominator which binds WEOG members is the sharing of economic, cultural, ideological and political characteristics. Israel would find a natural home with WEOG because it shares the objectives and characteristics of WEOG's membership.⁴⁰

Most GA votes pass either unanimously or with overwhelming majorities. Therefore, the extent to which Israel and WEOG shares common objectives can be measured by examining those votes where the majority of WEOG's member states voted in opposition to the majority of the GA.⁴¹ This method demonstrates the extent to which both Israel and WEOG share a common agenda distinct from that of the GA's majority.

Analyzing all votes between 1989 and 1994 where a majority of WEOG's member states voted in opposition to the GA majority reveals that out of a total of 37 such votes, Israel voted with the WEOG majority on 31 occasions. Israel, therefore, voted with WEOG and against the GA majority in 84 percent of the votes (see Appendix A14).

Israel consistently voted with WEOG on those issues most clearly delineating WEOG as a distinct group. These included opposition to the approach taken by a GA majority in crafting the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons;⁴² opposition to the GA majority's attempts to undermine the UN's ability to promote human rights forcefully;⁴³ and support for WEOG's distinct economic policies.⁴⁴

Israel's voting solidarity with WEOG compares favorably with that of other WEOG states. Of 20 states analyzed (19 WEOG member states and Israel), Israel was tenth most likely to vote with the WEOG majority (see Appendix A14). Furthermore, on those occasions when Israel did not vote with the WEOG majority, it chose to abstain.

⁴⁰ See B. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," American Political Science Review (Vol 60) (1966) 327-339.

⁴¹ See Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations; Marin-Bosch, "How Nations Vote in the General Assembly," International Organization (Vol. 47) (1987) 705-724.

⁴² GA Resolution 44/117(C)(1990), GA Resolution 44/119(B) (1990).

⁴³ GA Resolution 48/124 (1994), GA Resolution 48/123 (1994).

⁴⁴ GA Resolution 46/52 (1992), GA Resolution 46/210 (1992).

Israel's voting record also reflects the important economic, scientific and cultural ties Israel shares with the Western European members of WEOG.⁴⁵ The 1970 and 1975 commercial agreements between Israel and the European Union (EU) effectively abolished almost all trade barriers on manufactured goods between Israel and the EU and significantly reduced tariffs on agricultural products.⁴⁶ Western Europe is now by far Israel's largest trading partner.⁴⁷ In 1994 Israel's exports of goods to Western Europe totalled \$5.3 billion (31.3 percent of Israel's total exports), while Israel's imports from Western Europe totalled 14.3 billion dollars (60.1 percent of Israel's total imports).⁴⁸

Israel has worked closely with Western European states and organizations on scientific research and development.⁴⁹ Among these cooperative ventures has been Israel's participation in the EU's Directorate for Research, Science and Education.⁵⁰ Israel has also played an active role in scientific committees of the European division of UNESCO and in CERN.

In the last two years, the Western European states and Israel have continued to strengthen their economic, scientific and political ties.⁵¹ In December 1994 the EU's leaders declared their intention to accord special status to Israel in its relations with the EU and, in October 1995, the EU and Israel initialled the draft of a groundbreaking trade agreement.⁵²

Israel has developed strong economic, scientific, political and cultural ties with WEOG members because it shares common characteristics with these states. As with the economies of the WEOG members, Israel's economy is highly diversified and developed⁵³ (see [Appendix A15](#)).

While Israel has long been suitable for membership in WEOG, recent progress toward resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict now offers WEOG the ideal opportunity to admit Israel into its ranks, thereby making a substantial contribution to the Middle East Peace Process.

⁴⁵ Ed. H. Giersch, The Economic Integration of Israel in the EEC (1980) 13.

⁴⁶ Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph H. Weiler, Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbors (1988) 56-59.

⁴⁷ Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel) Foreign Trade Department.

⁴⁸ Id.

⁴⁹ Greilsammer at 340-341.

⁵⁰ Greilsammer at 339.

⁵¹ See "Excerpts of Joint Press Conference - Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Vice President of the European Community Manuel Marin," Jerusalem, February 17, 1994.

⁵² See Israeli Cabinet Decision Regarding Free Trade Treaty with European Union - Jerusalem, 7 June 1995.

⁵³ Greilsammer at 54; OECD Report (1995).

5. CONCLUSION

As a result of Israel's exclusion from the Group System it has been seriously prejudiced. Its representation at the UN has been severely compromised and its right to participate in all manner of UN activities has been severely curtailed.

Israel's exclusion violates three fundamental Charter principles: the right of states to be treated in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, the right to vote and participate equally in decision making at the GA and the right to participate equally in GA discussions.

Although the UN did not create the Group System it has become institutionally reliant on it. It therefore bears responsibility to redress the current Charter violations.

Ideally, Israel should be admitted to the Asian group. However, this group excludes Israel from its ranks. The best solution for the time being is Israel's admission to WEOG's ranks. Israel would find a natural home amongst its members. By so admitting Israel, WEOG would redress blatant Charter violations, as well as making a timely and meaningful contribution to the Middle East Peace Process.

At the end of the day the equation is simple: either Israel is admitted to a regional group or the Group System will continue to operate in violation of the Charter. The latter scenario is unacceptable. Not only does it put the UN at odds with its own constitution but it also casts a rent in the moral fabric upon which the UN was founded.

APPENDIX

THE GEOPOLITICAL GROUPS

AFRICAN REGIONAL GROUP

Algeria	Gabon	Niger
Angola	Gambia	Nigeria
Benin	Ghana	Rwanda
Botswana	Guinea	Sao Tome and Principe
Burkina Faso	Guinea-Bissau	Senegal
Burundi	Kenya	Seychelles
Cameroon	Lesotho	Sierra Leone
Cape Verde	Liberia	Somalia
Central African Republic	Libyan A.J.	South Africa
Chad	Madagascar	Sudan
Comoros	Malawi	Swaziland
Congo	Mali	Togo
Cote d'Ivoire	Mauritania	Tunisia
Djibouti	Mauritius	Uganda
Equatorial Guinea	Mozambique	U.R. of Tanzania
Eritrea	Nambia	Zambia
Ethopia		Zimbabwe

ASIAN REGIONAL GROUP

Afghanistan	Kazakhstan	Philippines
Bahrain	Kuwait	Qatar
Bangladesh	Kyrgystan	R.O.K.
Bhutan	Lao PDR	Samoa
Brunei Darussalam	Lebanon	Saudi Arabia
Cambodia	Malaysia	Singapore
China	Maldives	Solomon Islands
Cyprus	Marshall Islands	Sri Lanka
D.P.R.K.	Micronesia	Syrian
Fiji	Mongolia	Tajikistan
India	Myanmar	Thailand
Indonesia	Nepal	Turkmenistan
Iran	Oman	United Arab Emirates
Iraq	Pakistan	Vanatu
Japan	Palau	Viet Nam
Jordan	Papua New Guinea	Yemen

EASTERN EUROPEAN REGIONAL GROUP

Albania	Czech Republic	Romania
Armenia	Georgia	Russian Federation
Azerbaijan	Hungary	Slovakia
Belarus	Latvia	The Former Yugoslav
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Lithuania	Republic of Macedonia
Croatia	Republic of Moldova	Ukraine

LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL GROUP

Antigua and Barbuda	Dominican Republic	Paraguay
Argentina	Ecuador	Peru
Bahamas	El Salvador	Saint Kitts and Nevis
Barbados	Grenada	Saint Lucia
Belize	Guatemala	St. Vincent/Grenadines
Bolivia	Guyana	Suriname
Brazil	Haiti	Trinidad and Tobago
Chile	Honduras	Uruguay
Colombia	Jamaica	Venezuela
Costa Rica	Mexico	
Cuba	Nicaragua	
Dominica	Panama	

WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS GROUP

Andorra	Greece	New Zealand
Australia	Iceland	Norway
Austria	Ireland	Portugal
Belgium	Italy	San Marino
Canada	Liechtenstein	Spain
Denmark	Luxembourg	Sweden
Finland	Malta	Turkey
France	Monaco	United Kingdom
Germany	Netherlands	*United States

*The United States is an ad hoc member of WEOG. It attends WEOG meetings as an observer and is considered to be a member of that group for electoral purposes.

EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH BY
AMBASSADOR GAD YAACOBI

Davis Institute
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
May 1995

. . . We have a new agenda for a new era. When I was appointed as Ambassador to the UN in October 1992, we set four goals:

- 1) TRANSFORMATION: Changing the UN stance towards Israel.
- 2) INTEGRATION: Increasing involvement and participation in UN activities.
- 3) COOPERATION: Cooperating with other States and with the UN system.
- 4) NORMALIZATION: Normalizing Israel's relationship with the UN.

We are able to meet these goals because of the changes in the world and the region, coupled with the new policies of Israel's government. . . General Assembly resolutions are beginning to reflect the new reality. We have successfully worked for the elimination of obsolete resolutions that don't serve peace. Of the 30-or-so negative resolutions raised annually, over twenty were either not introduced, not brought to a vote, or changed in the last two General Assemblies.

For the past two years, the General Assembly -- for the first time-- has adopted a resolution that supports the peace process, and calls for regional co-operation. 149 countries supported the resolution. Only Syria, Lebanon, Libya and Iran opposed it. It is the first positive resolution on the Middle East since the Security Council adopted resolutions 242 and 338 more than 20 years ago.

For the first time, Israelis are being elected to UN bodies. In November 1993, the former Director of the Ministry of Justice, Mayer Gabay, was elected as a justice on the UN Administrative Tribunal. He was the first Israeli candidate elected to a UN post in thirty years. Dr. Carmel Shalev was elected to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; Professor David Kretzmer was elected to the UN Human Rights Committee; and Judith Karp was elected in February [1995] to the Committee on the Rights of the Child.

. . . Still there is a long way to go.

Israel has to be accepted for membership in a geopolitical group. 184 countries out of 185 at the UN enjoy this basic right. Except Israel. This violation of the principle of universality cannot be allowed to continue. For the time being, we are looking to the Western European and Others Group, which is made up of democracies on three continents.

We want to see the Palestinian bodies at the UN eliminated. This includes the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat, the so-called Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices, and the so-called Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, among others.

And there is still much more in the General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East that needs improvement. . .

RELEVANT ARTICLES FROM THE UN CHARTER

Article 2

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 18

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1(c) the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-

permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

RELEVANT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS

RESOLUTION 18/1991 A, as recommended by Special Political Committee, A/5675, adopted by the GA on 17 December 1963, meeting 1285, by roll-call vote of 97 to 11, with 4 abstentions:

The General Assembly,

Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced,

Recognizing that the increase in the membership of the United Nations makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of the Security Council, thus providing for a more adequate geographical representation of non-permanent members and making it a more effective organ for carrying out its functions under the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter,

1. *Decides* to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, the following amendments to the Charter and to submit them for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations:

(a) In Article 23, paragraph 1, the word "eleven" in the first sentence shall be replaced by the word "fifteen", and the word "six" in the third sentence by the word "ten";

(b) In Article 23, paragraph 2, the second sentence, shall then be reworded as follows:

"In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year;"

(c) In Article 27, paragraph 2, the word "seven" shall be replaced by the word "nine";

(d) In Article 27, paragraph 3, the word "seven" shall be replaced by the word "nine";

2. Calls upon all Member States to ratify the above amendments in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by 1 September 1965;

3. Further decides that the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern:

(a) Five from the African and Asian States;

(b) One from the Eastern European States;

(c) Two from Latin American States;

(d) Two from Western European and other States.

RESOLUTION 18/1991 B, as recommended by Special Political Committee, A/5675, adopted by Assembly on 17 December 1963, meeting 1285, by roll-call vote of 96 to 11, with 5 abstentions:

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the increase in the membership of the United Nations makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of the Economic and Social Council with a view to providing for a more adequate geographical representation therein and making it a more effective organ for carrying out its functions under Chapters IX and X of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolutions 974 B and C (XXXVI) of 22 July 1963,

Bearing in mind, the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter,

1. *Decides* to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, the following amendment to the Charter and to submit it for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations:

Article 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of twenty-seven Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. Subject to the Provisions of paragraph 3, nine members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven members, in addition to the members elected in place of the six members whose term of office expires at the end of that year, nine additional members shall be elected. Of these nine additional members, the term of office of three members so elected shall expire at the end of one year, and of three other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to ratify the above amendment, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by 1 September 1965;

3. *Further decides* that, without prejudice to the present distribution of seats in the Economic and Social Council, the nine additional members shall be elected according to the following pattern:

- (a) Seven from African and Asian States;
- (b) One from Latin American States;
- (c) One from Western European and other States.

RESOLUTION 18/1992, as proposed by Second Committee, adopted by Assembly on 17 December 1963, meeting 1285, by roll-call vote of 96 to 0, with 11 abstentions:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the overwhelming will of the Member States that the Economic and Social Council be enlarged and its membership redistributed to reflect correctly the membership of the United Nations,

Noting with satisfaction Economic and Social Council resolution 36/974 C of 22 July 1963 on the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council, adopted by the Council at the initiative of the Economic Commission for Africa,

Noting that many subsidiary bodies of the Economic and Social Council are already larger than the Council itself and that it is within the council's competence, in accordance with Article 68 of the Charter of the United Nations, to determine the membership of all its subsidiary bodies,

Desiring, as an interim measure and pending the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council itself to improve forthwith the representative character of the subsidiary bodies of the Council,

Invites the Economic and Social Council at its resumed thirty-sixth session to enlarge the membership of the Economic Committee, the Social Committee and the Co-ordination Committee and to carry out forthwith necessary elections so as to permit these committees to become, without delay, representative of the membership of the United Nations.

RESOLUTION 26/2847, as recommended by Special Political Committee, was adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1971 by a recorded vote.

The General Assembly

Recognizing that an enlargement of the Economic and Social Council will provide broad representation of the United Nations membership as a whole and make the Council a more effective organ for carrying out its functions under Chapters IX and X of the Charter of the United Nations,

Having considered the report of the Economic and Social Council.

1. *Takes note* of Economic and Social Council resolution 1621 (LI) of 30 July 1971:

2. *Decides* to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, the following amendment to the Charter and to submit it for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations.

Article 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four members, in addition to the members elected in place of the nine members whose term of office expires at the end of that year, twenty-seven additional members shall be elected. Of these twenty-seven additional members, the term of office of nine members so elected shall expire at the end of one year, and of nine other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

3. *Urges* all Member States to ratify the above amendment in accordance with their respective constitutional processes as soon as possible and to deposit their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General;

4. *Further decides* that the members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected according to the following pattern:

- (a) Fourteen members from African States;
- (b) Eleven members from Asian States;
- (c) Ten members from Latin American States;
- (d) Thirteen members from Western European and other States;
- (e) Six members from the socialist States of Eastern Europe.

5. *Welcomes* the decision of the Economic and Social Council, pending the receipt of the necessary ratifications, to enlarge its sessional committees to fifty-four members.

6. *Invites* the Economic and Social Council, as soon as possible and not later than the organizational meetings of its fifty-second session, to elect the twenty-seven additional members from States Members of the United Nations to serve on the enlarged sessional committees; such elections should be in accordance with paragraph 4 above and should be held each year pending the coming into force of the enlargement of the Council;

7. *Decides* that as of the date of the entry into force of the above amendments, rule 147 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly shall be amended to read:

Rule 147

The General Assembly shall each year, in the course of its regular session elect eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council for a term of three years.

RESOLUTION 33/138, as recommended by Special Political Committee, adopted by Assembly on 19 December by recorded vote of 105 to 29, with 3 abstentions:

The General Assembly

Recognizing that the composition of the various organs of the United Nations should be so constituted as to ensure their representative character,

Taking into account the considerable increase in the membership of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 18/1990 of 17 December 1963,

Taking also into account that the General Committee of the General Assembly should be enlarged with a view to providing for a more adequate geographical representation,

Believing that it is desirable to distribute the vice-presidencies of the General Assembly and the chairmanships of the Main Committees separately between the African and Asian States,

Noting that the General Committee is composed of the President of the General Assembly, the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly and the Chairmen of the Main Committees,

1. *Decides* to amend rules 31 and 38 of its rule of procedure as follows:

Rule 31

The General Assembly shall elect a President and twenty one Vice-Presidents, who shall hold office until the close of the session at which they are elected. The Vice-Presidents shall be elected, after the election of the Chairmen of the seven Main Committees referred to in rule 98, in such a way as to ensure the representative character of the General Committee.

Rule 38

The General Committee shall comprise the President of the General Assembly, who shall preside, the twenty-one Vice Presidents and the Chairmen of the seven Main Committees. No two members of the General Committee shall be members of the same delegation, and it shall be so constituted as to ensure its

representative character. Chairmen of other committees upon which all Members have the right to be represented and which are established by the General Assembly to meet during the session shall be entitled to attend meetings of the General Committee and may participate without vote in the discussions.

2. *Decides* to replace the annex to General Assembly resolution 18/1990 by the annex to the present resolution concerning the election of the President of the General Assembly, the twenty-one Vice-Presidents of the Assembly and the seven Chairmen of the Main Committees;

3. *Decides* to include in the agenda of its thirty fourth session the item entitled Question of the composition of the relevant organs of the United Nations.

ANNEX

1. In the election of the President of the General Assembly, regard shall be had for equitable geographical rotation of this office among the regions mentioned in paragraph 4 below.

2. The twenty-one Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly shall be elected according to the following pattern, subject to paragraph 3 below:

- (a) Six representatives from African States;
- (b) Five representatives from Asian States;
- (c) One representative from an Eastern European State;
- (d) Three representatives from Latin American States;
- (e) Two representatives from Western European or other States;
- (f) Five representatives from the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. The election of the President of the General Assembly will, however, have the effect of reducing by one the number of vice-presidencies allocated to the region from which the President is elected.

4. The seven Chairmen of the Main Committees shall be elected according to the following pattern:

- (a) Two representatives from African States;
- (b) One representative from an Asian State;
- (c) One representative from an Eastern European State;
- (d) One representative from a Latin American State;
- (e) One representative from a Western European or other State;
- (f) The seventh chairmanship shall rotate every alternate year among representatives of States mentioned in sub-paragraphs (b) and (d) above.

**UN BODIES ANALYZED IN
PREPARATION OF THE BRIEF**

1. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF ILO
2. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF UNDP
3. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF UNICEF
4. THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF UNEP
5. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF WFC
6. THE GENERAL COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
7. THE COMMITTEE FOR PROGRAM CO-ORDINATION
8. THE COMMITTEE FOR CONTRIBUTIONS
9. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD
10. THE JOINT INSPECTION UNIT

**MEASUREMENT OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH
WEOG'S MEMBER STATES AND ISRAEL
SHARE WEOG 'S OBJECTIVES AT THE UN**

The chart below lists the number of times members of WEOG and Israel voted with the WEOG majority in all instances between 1989-1994 (44th GA Session - 48th GA Session) where the WEOG majority voted in opposition to the GA majority.

	<u>44th</u>	<u>45th</u>	<u>46th</u>	<u>47th</u>	<u>48th</u>		
	<u>Session</u>	<u>Session</u>	<u>Session</u>	<u>Session</u>	<u>Session</u>		
AUSTRIA	3	2	5	4	5	total N=	19
SPAIN	6	3	3	4	4	total N=	20
IRELAND	3	5	6	4	5	total N=	23
GERMANY	8	7	9	0	1	total N=	25
NEW ZEALAND	7	6	7	5	3	total N=	28
AUSTRALIA	7	6	8	6	4	total N=	31
FINLAND	5	5	9	6	6	total N=	31
PORTUGAL	7	6	7	6	5	total N=	31
SWEDEN	5	5	9	6	6	total N=	31
ISRAEL*	4	6	9	6	6	total N=	31
DENMARK	7	7	9	7	5	total N=	35
FRANCE	8	7	8	7	5	total N=	35
ICELAND	6	7	9	7	6	total N=	35
BELGIUM	7	7	9	7	6	total N=	36
ITALY	8	7	8	7	6	total N=	36
LUXEMBOURG	8	7	8	7	6	total N=	36
NORWAY	8	7	9	6	6	total N=	36
CANADA	8	7	9	7	6	total N=	37
NETHERLANDS	8	7	9	7	6	total N=	37
U.K.	8	7	9	7	6	total N=	37